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INTRODUCTION
This article is about the concept of arbitration law and its
relationship with international arbitration scholarship. Despite
the meteoric rise of the field of international arbitration in the
last forty years, this topic has attracted no attention from
international arbitration scholars.
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This is perhaps unsurprising. Developing a concept of
arbitration law requires research that transcends arbitration and
non-arbitration fields, mainly in the fields of legal theory and
socio-legal
jurisprudence.
Equally,
it
requires
an
interdisciplinary framework of analysis. However, as this article
argues, the field of international arbitration scholarship has
been developing in isolation from crucial theoretical
developments in other legal and non-legal disciplines. Partly
because of its close relevance to legal practice, arbitration was
not originally considered a subject of academic importance.
Accordingly, arbitration scholarship was driven primarily by
lawyers practicing in the area of arbitration, rather than
academics. Practicing arbitration lawyers were not concerned
with the concept or legal theory of arbitration or how socio-legal
jurisprudence may relate to the subject of arbitration. Their
focus was on scholarship that would directly respond to the
problems they were facing in arbitration practice. Equally their
methods of inquiry were not empirical, scientific, contextual or
interdisciplinary; their primary method of analysis was the
traditional approach taken for legal research, namely doctrinal
analysis that focuses exclusively on legal statutes and case law.
As a result, arbitration scholarship never fully engaged with
the crucial movements and theories of international legal
scholarship that advanced a more progressive and humanitarian
concept of international law. With rare exceptions,
interdisciplinary research did not appear in arbitration
scholarship, and arbitration law was not critically examined
through the prism of political theory, international affairs or
economics. The dearth of interdisciplinary scholarship has had
two undesirable implications for the field of arbitration.
First, it has had a negative impact on how non-arbitration
scholars and the public perceive arbitration. By failing to
develop a large-scale perspective and to engage with a wider
group of lawyers and non-lawyers, arbitration lawyers have
obscured the relevance, role and contribution of arbitration
theory and practice to other areas of law and to society. The
discipline of arbitration often seems to be under the selfreassuring delusion that its contribution to the public is
somehow axiomatic: arbitration serves the business community,
and therefore it serves the interests of the public too. However,
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the prevailing perception of arbitration by non-arbitration
scholars and by a critical mass of the public is often quite
different. Aibitration is increasingly viewed as an opaque system
that unduly interferes with the state's ability to protect the
values, traditions and interests of the public.' Although it is
critical for the future of arbitration, this type of unfavorable
implications is not the focus of this work.
Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this
article, the failure of arbitration to engage with the
developments in international legal scholarship has crucially
impaired the concept and autonomy of arbitration law. As the
paper explains, arbitration scholarship has failed to connect
with modernist scholarship on anti-formalism and legal
pluralism that have advanced a more inclusive concept of
international law. Such a progressive concept of law focuses on
content rather than pedigree and recognises the important role
of legal principles and other standards such as policies and
practices. However, arbitration scholarship has largely remained
adherent to an old-fashioned version of positivism that accepts
state legal rules only. Thus, arbitration scholarship has failed to
develop an account of international arbitration as a non-state
community that has the capacity to produce legal rules.
Eventually, it has failed to advance persuasive claims of
normativity and autonomy of international arbitration.
The main purpose of this work is to connect arbitration
scholarship with the theoretical developments in international
law, and crucially to develop an account of normativity for

1. For investment arbitration see generally GUS VAN 1-IARTEN, INVESTMFNT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAw (2007); Gus Van Harten, PerceivedBias in Investment
Treaty Arbitraton, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 433, 434-36

(Michael WAaibel et al., eds., 2010) (arguing that the arbitration paradigm is not
appropriate for investment treaty disputes. because the latter concerns the "cxercise of
general regulatory powers that are t pically sub ect tojudicial review under

constitutional or administ ative law"); David Kennedy, Law and the PoliticalEconomy of
the World. 26 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 7. 43 (2013) [hereinafter Kennedy, PoliticalEconomT]
("Arbitration has metastasized to become an adjudicator of last resort for reviewing the
legislative, administrative and even judicial decisions of the de veloping world."); see also
Linda Silberman, InternationalAbitration: Comments from a Crtic, 13 AM. RLV. NT'L ARB.
9, 17 (2002) ("My quarrel with these arious dispute resolution mechanisms has more
to do with the basic underlying decision to entrust matters of great public significance
to decision-iaking by supranational institutions than it does with arbitration per sc.

But the process of arbitration exacerbates the concern.").
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arbitration law. The central argument of this work is that
international arbitration is a community that has the capacity to
engender non-state rules which the members of this community
accept as normative. As this article shows, clear norms regulating
the conduct of arbitration have emerged from practices
consistently applied in arbitration, which the members of the
arbitration community have tended to follow and to accept as
guiding principles. There are aspects of arbitration practice that
are so well-established among arbitration lawyers that they breed
expectations of compliance, or normative expectations. What is
equally crucial is that arbitration practices and expectations of
compliance derive from a legal principle, namely the legal
principle of fair process. As is explained, the existence of legal
principles is a distinctive feature of a system or a normative
community, as such principles set out the general values, goals
and needs of that community, which guide the behaviour of the
members of that community. This article does not purport to
argue that arbitration rules are homogenous, fully determinate,
or self-executing. These attributes exist only in state law.
However, after the progressive legal scholarship of the last
century we now know that different concepts of law exist. We
have also started to realize that normativity occurs in both state
and non-state communities, and in different forms and degrees. As
has been observed, normativity and regulation "form a
continuum [whose] legal character . . . is often a matter of

degree and (not necessarily a resolvable) debate." 2 It is within
this concept of relative normativity that international arbitration
can forcefully claim its normative potency.
This article is divided in four parts. Part I gives an overview
of the developments in international legal scholarship in the last
fifty years. It examines how policy-oriented legal scholarship and
interdisciplinary research have crucially affected the concept of
international law. Here an overview of scholarship relating to
anti-formalism and legal pluralism is offered to illustrate the
thesis that the concept of international law has shifted from a
concept dominated by pedigree and sovereignty to a more
inclusive one that encompasses informal legal norms and non-

2. See Roger Cottcrrell, Spectres of Transnationalism:Changing Terrains of Sociology of
Law, 36j.L- & SOCY 481, 485 (2009) [hereinafter Cotterrell, Spectres].
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state actors. Such a concept of law pays attention to content and
recognises the important role of legal principles and other
standards such as policies and practices. The discussion of this
progressive concept of law is necessary, as it provides the basis of
the main analysis of this work on arbitration's normative potency
in the final part of the article. Part II explains how arbitration
scholarship has failed to connect with the developments in
international legal scholarship and international law. This part
examines the development of arbitration scholarship through
doctrinal work produced by lawyers who were mainly practising
in the field of arbitration. It further examines the main themes
of arbitration scholarship and discusses the theory of
delocalization, which was one of the few progressive movements
in arbitration scholarship that appeared to have implications on
legal theory. As this article shows, with the exception of a small
number of French theorists, arbitration theory has failed to
critically engage with non-arbitration and non-legal scholarship,
focusing exclusively on doctrinal analysis. As a result, arbitration
theory was largely developed under the "delusion of selfsufficiency as a science of law". Part III discusses the reasons
why it matters that arbitration theory has failed to engage with
crucial movements and theories of international legal
scholarship. As is explained, such a failure has crucially impaired
the concept of arbitration law and has curtailed the efforts of
arbitration scholarship to advance persuasive claims of
autonomy and normativity. As a result, international arbitration
remains firmly subject to national laws and state public policy,
while international tribunals are considered to be subservient to
national courts as opposed to being an alternative to them.
Finally, Part IV examines the normative potency of arbitration
law. The analysis here draws on scholarship relating to antiformalism and legal pluralism to advance the thesis that a
common ground of settled assumptions on arbitration conduct
has emerged, which guide arbitration practice and breed
expectations of compliance, or normative expectations. A
number of examples of arbitration practices are discussed here
to illustrate the point of normative expectations.
3.

Roger Cotterrdi.

Ehrlich at the Edge of Empire: Centres and Penpheries in Legal

Studies in LiviNG L.Aw: RECONSIDERING EUGLN EHRLICH 75 (Marc Hertogh ed, 2009)

[hereinafter Cotterrell, Edge ofEmpire].
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Before we turn to the main analysis, it is necessary to discuss
a methodological point. A combination of approaches has been
taken for the purposes of this work.4 For the most part, the
analysis draws on legal theory and socio-legal literature. This is
of course necessary as the main thrust of the argument of this
work is that arbitration scholarship has never critically engaged
with non-arbitration discourse and methodology. Some parts of
the article however also engage in doctrinal analysis and review
case law and legal texts. This type of analysis is necessary to
discuss how arbitration law is currently treated by national
judiciaries and legislatures, and to support the observation that
international arbitration remains firmly subject to national laws
and state public policy. The use of a combination of methods
further underlines the main premise of this article, namely that
arbitration scholarship needs to engage in both doctrinal and
non-doctrinal analysis. This approach can assist arbitration
theorists to produce a broader narrative of arbitration law and
practice, which will be more appealing and accessible to nonarbitration scholars and to the public. More crucially they will
assist them to construct a general theory of arbitration law that is
both normative and conceptual and able to demonstrate
arbitration's normative potency.
1. PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP AND THE CONCEPT OFINTERNATIONAL LAW
The last fifty years has been an exciting time for
international law. 5 Successive waves of progressive legal
4. I use the terms "approach" and "methodology" interchangeably for the
purposes of this work. For the similarities and differences in meaning of the terms
"methodology," "approach," and "method," see ROBERT CR1FR ET AL., RESEARCH
METHODOLOGTES IN EU AND INTERNATIONAL LXw 5 (2011).
5 . The term "international law" is used here in its widest sense and

interchangeably with the term "transnational law." It primarily refers to the classic
definition as proffered by Philip Jessup-"Trainsational law then includes both civil
and criminal aspects, it includes what, we know as public and private international law.
and it includes national law, both public and private. There is no inherent reason why a
judicial tribunal, whether national or international, should not be authorised to choose
from all of these bodies of law the rule considered to be most in conformity with reason
and justice for the solution of any particular controversy. The choice need not be
determined
by territoriality, personality, nationality, domicile, jurisdiction,
sovereignty. . . ." PHILIP JESSUP,

TRANSNATIONAL

L.Aw 106

(1956).

Both

terms,

"international" and "transnational law," are used widely in legal scholarship, with some
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scholarship have introduced a series of new ideas, new
institutions and new methods of inquiry to break away from the
doctrinal constraints of formalism. As a result, a new concept of
international law has emerged, which encompasses not only
state legal rules, but also legal principles, policies and norms.b
The progressive shift to a more pragmatic and functional
international law started to gather pace after the end of World
War II. International legal scholarship responded to the
pervasive legal and political uncertainty of the post-war era in
two ways. First, a group of international lawyers engaged in a
huge enterprise of codification, of multilateral law and
institution building with a view to developing an international
administrative law.7 The lofty aim of these lawyers was to build a
global institutional regime of "procedural regularity and
normative proliferation in which most actors abide by most
norms most of the time."8
Secondly, another group of modernist international
lawyers, somehow counter-intuitively, rejected codification and
pushed the legal discourse more forcefully toward policy and
functionalism. Modernist international lawyers of this era may
scholars preferring the former (Koskenniemi, Berman, Franck, Posner) and others
preferring the latter (Cotterrell, Carbonneau, Wai, Whyttock, Callicss and
Zuibansen). Other conmentators consider the term "international law" wrong and
favor the term "global law" (Teubner). In any case, all these terms ("international",
"transnational," and "global law") have a wide meaning and therefore-for the
purposes of this study-arc preferable to the term lex nercatoria (used for examplc by
Cutler), which focuses exclusively on private law and the law merchant.
6. See David Kennedy, InternationalLaw and the Nineteenth Centur. History of an
Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. RL. 99, 101 (1997) [hereinafter Kcnnedy, InternationalLaw];
see also Nigel Purvis, CriticalLegal Studies in Public InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L. I-.
81 (1991).
7. Joseph Weiler, The Geology of Internatinal Law-Governance, Denocracy and
Legitinacy, 64 ZAORV 547, 549 (2004) ("In mid-century one discovers a huge enterprise
of actual and in-the-making multilateral law making treaties ranging from the Law of
the Sea to Hunan Rights and even what may be called "constitutional treaties."; cf.
David Kennedy, International Legal Education, 26 HARV. INTI L.J. 361, 363 (1985)
(observing that international lawyers and scholars after the Second World War
"consummated the ninctcenth century struggle between naturalism and positivism in
an uneasy positivist truce and fueled the two great waves of international institution
building in this century").

8. Kennedy, InternationalLaw, supra note 6, at 101.
9. Notable scholars who have produced modernist policy-oriented work include
Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell. For an example, see generally Myres McDougal,
INTLRNATIONAL Lxw, POWER AND POLICY: A CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTION (1

9

54). The

work of McDougal and Lasswell picks up on the socio-legal work that Roscoe Pound
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have enthusiastically embarked on policy-oriented work out of
frustration with the doctrinal purity of the legal scholarship of
the first part of the tewntieth century, which had failed to
prevent two world wars. Alternatively, they may have felt that
positivism-which we must remember was the progressive
movement in the

1 9 th

century-had exhausted its raison d'etre

by safely separating law from religion and morality."o
Either way, policy-oriented international legal scholarship
paved the way for the post-modernist movement of
interdisciplinary work which dominated the legal discourse in
the 80's and 90's. I The fervor over interdisciplinary research
opened new horizons for the discipline of international law in
two different directions.1 2
First, it transcended boundaries between legal and non-legal
disciplines. Here, international legal scholars ventured to
examine law from a number of different and indeed divergent
perspectives. Some relied heavily on science and drew mainly on
economics and political theory to found new disciplines, such as
law and economics and international relations.", Others, not
and lkgal realists had started in the pre-war cra. See Harold Koh, TransnationalLegal
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 189 (1996).
10. See Kennedy, InternationalLaw, supra note 6, at 113-14 (arguing that, in a
paradoxical way, positivisln's triunph in the late nineteenth century "puts international
law on the road to pragmatism" and paved the way to realism, socio-legal jurisprudence
and international relations theory).

11. See Koh, supra note 9, at 188: David Kennedy, A Rotation in Contemporary Legal
Scholarship, 12 GERMAN L. J. 338, 356-61 (2011).
12. See Purvis, supra note 6, at 81 ("For some thirty-five years international law had
been isolated from the rest of intellectual life by the necessities and distractions of two
world wars. By mid-century the insights of modernist thinking wvere only just beginning
to influence the discipline of international law. A new breed of modern scholars of
international law thought they were about to transform their discipline, removing
international law from the theoretical and doctrinal disharmony that had characterized
much of its history."); Uf David Kennedy, A New Stream ofInternationalLaw Scholarship, 7
Wis. INT'L L.J. 1 at 3-4 (1988) ("The post-W orld War II generation was different ....
Although these men wvere enthusiasts about international law and institutions, they
slowly abandoned the doctrinal purity and institutional isolation characteristic of the
pre-war generation. Self-described pragmatists and functionalists. sneaking up on
sovereignty in numerous ingenious ways, they self-consciously blurred the boundaries
between national and international, public and private law. They imported into public
international law precisely the realist attack on doctrinal formalism which the pre-war
generation has resisted.").
13. Scholarship in law and economics was particularly strong in that period,
witnessing the emergence of a number of influential theories and franeworks of
analysis such as the rational choice theory and the organizational theory. Koh calls this
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least the Critical Legal Studies scholars,'14 examined law through
the prism of disciplines that were less likely companions for
international law, such as psychologyj literature,1b feminism,1
gay discourse,'S and race studies. 1
This type of interdisciplinary work was not concerned with
doctrinal debates about international law. Employing scientific,
often empirical, methods of inquir, 2" this group of scholars was
interested in how international law may affect the real actors;
how international law pertains to society, politics, economics,
and international affairs.'
scholarship "high-tech economics in international trade law." See Koh, supra note 9, at
190. For scholarship on international relations scholarship see Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burilc, International Law and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J.
INTL L. 205. 205 (1993): Anne-Maric Slaughter et al., International Law and
In t r ational Relatons Tlory: A New Generation of Interdisiplinay Scholarship, 92 AN1 J.
INT'T L. 367 (1998).
14. See Mark Kehnan, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 11 (1987) ("CLS
might wvell seem to be the latest revival of an anti-Formalist, Legal Realist movement at
law schools" who were pursuing a critical approach toward the study of law in society).
As the organizers of the inaugural annual 1977 conference on Critical Legal Studies
were noting, "law is an instrument of social, economic and political domination both in
the sense of furthering the concrete interests of the dominators and in that of
legitimating the existing order: this approach emnphasises the ideological character of
legal doctrine and is therefore more concerned with its internal structure than the
approach that focuses on latent social functions." Id.; Uf Duncan Kennedy & Karl Klare,
A Bibliographry of CriticalLegal Studies, 94 YALE L. J. 461 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Subsanle in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 H ARV. I. REV. 1685 (1976).
15
See Antony Carty, Intenoar German Theories of International Law:
ThePsychoanalytical and PhenomenologicalPerspectives of Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 1235 (1995) (examining how Kelsen's and Schmitt's legal work and
theory was influenced by Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytical work)
16. See Jane Baron & Julia Epstein, Language and the Law: Literature, Narrative and
Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, 662 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); James Boyle,
Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of Language, 26
HARV. INTL. L.J. 327 (1985).
17. See Hilary Charlesworth et al., Femninis Approaches toInternationalLaw, 85 AM.j.
INTI. LAw 613 (1991); see also Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Wonen's
Subordinationand the Role ofLaw, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 328 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed.
1998).
18. See generall Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation ssues in the Ethics
ofRepresentation, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 115-47 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
19. See Charles R Lawrence III, Race and 4Jfirnatie Action: A Critical Race
Perspective, in THL POLITICS OF LAw 312-28 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
20. See Toin Ginsburg & Gregoly Shaffer, How Does InternationalLaw Work?: What
Empiical Research Shows, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL ILEGAL STUDIES 753, 754
(Peteir Cane & Herbert Kritzer eds., 2010)
21. There have been remarkable studies of this kind which one can indicatively
only refer to. For socio-legal analysis see NIKLAS LUIHMANN, IAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM
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The second strand of interdisciplinary work transcended
boundaries within law, most notably breaking down the
traditional dichotomy of private and public international law.
The project of bridging the gap between private and
international law was prompted by the realization that these two
disciplines of law were increasingly facing the same problems.22
The aim of this project was to develop a more coherent and
eventually fairer version of international law, 23 bringing
individuals and corporations into the foreground of
international law. This liberal24 Vision of a global law has led to
the attribution of rights to individuals as against states on an
international level.25 Examples of international private rights can
now be found in a number of areas of law, including
environmental law, tort, proprietary rights, and maritime law.
Most notably, international private rights can be found in the
area of human rights (including civil, political, economic and
social rights), the violation of which allows individuals to bring a
(2009). For a critical examination of international law and politics. see MARTTI
KOSKENNiTEMI, THE PO1 ITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011). For an economics and law
analysis see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANATYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2010). For an
examination of international law through the lnses of political science and rational
choice theory see JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAI LAW\
(2005); see also Anne-Maric Slaughter, in a series of works, supra note 13. Cf KENNEDY,
supra note 1, at 7 ("The visible interpenetration of global political and economic life
has changed the context for international scholarly inquiry. The central questions
today are not political questions-if by that we mean questions to be addressed by
governments as acting alone or negotiated through conventional diplomatic circuits.
They are not economic questions-if by that we mean questions to be answered by the
operations of markets, guided by the hand of robust competition in the shadow of
regulation."). Kennedy then proceeds arguing that the main questions today are
questions of political economy. See id.
22. See Koh, supra note 9, at 184-85; ALEx MILLS, CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY
INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF PRITATE I TFE 3 (2009).

IN

THE

23. Ralf Michats, Public and Private Law in the Global Adjudication Systen: Three
Questions, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 253 (2008); MILLS, supra note 22. at 3: Koh,
supa note 9, at 184.
24. The liberal character of this project has prompted fierce contestation from
left scholars; see. for example, CLAIRE CUTLER. PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL
AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT I AW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 183
(2003) (observing that transnational merchant law is "deeply implicated in the
ordering of state-society relations because [it] operatc[s] to recast 'publiC concerns
as 'private' and thus [is] not subject to democratic methods of scrutiny and review").
25. See Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, [2005] E.W.C.A. (Civ)
1116. 1[ 16 (appeal taken from Queen's Bench Division) (holding that BITS provide
direct standing to individuals and investors); see also MILLS, supra note 22, at 264.
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direct claim before the European Court of Human Rights.26
Equally, investment treaty agreements accord individuals the
right to bring direct actions against states.27
All these modern and post-modern movements of
international legal scholarship have affected international law in
two crucial ways. First, they have affected the nature of and
inquiries about international law. International law has become
more progressive and humanitarian in nature, extending its
scope over civil and human rights, health care and the
environment. 2 As the scope of international law widens,
26. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 34, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("The Court may receive
applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the
rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.").
27. Francesco Francioni, Access to justice, Denial of Justice and International
Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANT) ARBITRATION 65 (PierreMaric Dupuy ct al. cds., 2009) ("Following the phenomenal development in the past
[twcnty-fivc] years of bilateral investment treatics, regional trade agreements, such as
NAFTA, and more importantly of investment arbitration, the right of access to justice
for the investor has shifted from intcr-state claims to the private-to-state arbitration
where private actors have direct access to international remedial process without the
traditional need for the interposition of the national state in diplomatic protection.");
see also Tillmann Rudolf Braun, Globalization: The Driving Force in InternationalInvestment
Law, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVLSTMENT ARBITRATION 491 (Michael Waibcl, Asha

Kaushal, et al. eds., 2010) ("[I]nsoiar as modern bilateral investment treaties assure
investors material rights along with associated formal enforcement proccdurcs, they
contribute to a fundamental change in international law-thc individual or legal
person in private law is assigned individual rights through a treaty in international law
and thus is upgraded to thc status of a partial ubject of intcrnational law."). Further, the
so-called "umbrella clauses," found in at Icast fifty percent of investment treaty
agreements, even allow investors to bring investment treaty claims against states for
contractual breachcs. See Stephan W. Schill, The Robert E. Hudec Article on Global Trade:
Enabling Pivate Ordering: Function. Scope and Effect of Unbrella Clauses in International
Investment Treatie, 18 MINN.J. INT'L L. 1, 47-48 (2009). Of course, contestations still
persist on a number of areas concerning international private rights: it is contCsted for
examplc whether these rights arc rights attributable directly to individuals by
international law or whether they are merely rights of states in relation to their
nationals.
28. Cf Kcnnedy, InternationalLaw, supra note 6, at 102 ("The great innovations of
twentieth century international law-a theoretical and doctrinal pragmatism, the
dramatic expansion of international institutions and non-statc actors, the doctrinal

disestablishmcnt of sovereignty and blurring of the boundarics bctween public and
private or international and municipal law, decolonization and the engagement with
politics, cconomics and sociology, not to mention the great normative projects of state
responsibility, human rights, and so on-havc

begun

largely as the projects

of

disciplinary progressives. At least within the intellectual establishments of the West and
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questions about international law change and new challenges
emerge. International legal scholars are currently concerned
not so much with whether international law exists; they are
mainly concerned with whether international law is fair and
inclusive." This type of inquiry is closely related to legitimacy,

and although it implicates international arbitration too, it goes
beyond the scope of this article and it is not examined here.
Secondly, the developments in the international legal
scholarship have affected the concept of international law, which
has shifted from a concept dominated by pedigree and
sovereignty to a more inclusive one that encompasses informal
legal norms and non-state actors. It is this aspect of international
law's progress that is most relevant for the purposes of this
article. Thus, it is useful to provide an overview of scholarship
relating to anti-formalism and legal pluralism before turning to
the concept of arbitration law.
In the heyday of positivism, international law was exclusively
structured around the idea of nation-state, which was seen as the
indispensable framework of legal order. On-state actors, either
individuals or corporations, were not recognized as subjects of
international

law

and

were

denied

standing

to

initiate

proceedings in international courts and tribunals.so Only rules
that derived from a formal source-typically sovereignty-and

North, public international law in the twentieth century has largely been a progressive
and humanist discipline, marked by its hostility to what is remembered as the classical
system. This more pragmatic approach may well provide the lawyer a broader tool kit of
solutions to transboundary problems, from AIDS to the environment.").

29. THOM1AS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 6
(1998) ("The question to which international lawyer mnust now be prepared to respond
[is] ... whether ... international law [is] fair?"); KOSKENNILMI, supra not 21, at 334
("The new developments in the law did not point to unity. The more powerfully they

dealt with intLernational probleins-problens of economics, development, human
rights, environment, criminality security-the more they began to challenge old
principles and institutions"); Kennedy, Political Economy, supra note 1, at 12 (suggesting
that international law should now focus its attcntion "on crucial questions of global
political econonly: the dynamics of inequality, the distributions of growth, the
reproduction of hierarchies within and between leading and lagging sectors, regions,
nations and cultures.").
30. See Mavrommnatis Palestine Concessions (Grecce v. Britain), Judgeincnt, 1924
P.C.I.]. (ser. 11) No. 3, at 12 (Aug. 30) ("By taking up the case of one of its subjects and

by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a
State is in reality assertmg its own rightits

iL

ight to ensure. in the person of its

subjects, respect for the rules of international law.")
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developed through formal processes were accepted as law.)1
Developing, adjudicating, or enforcing norms beyond and
outside the hierarchy of the state was seriously questioned;32 in
fact, for some scholars, any non-state rule was considered as nonlaw, as it lacked the ability to sanction non-performance.34
However, technology after the Second World War
dramatically enhanced the prospect of communication and
synergies, and facilitated the development of commercial and
non-commercial communities, which transcend state territorial
boundaries. 35 Contemporary societies see fewer reasons to
organise in vertical state-hierarchies. Instead human and
business activity is now organized in horizontal, transnational
and specialized non-state communities, which are strongly
connected and affiliated on the basis of common activities and
interests.6 These communities, which operate within or outside
31. See Francis Mann,

The UNCITR4L Wodel Law-Lex

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUNi FOR MARTIN

Sanders
recently
32.
33.

ed.
has
See
See

Facit Arbitrurm,
DOMKE

157

in

(Pieter

1967), reprinted in 2 ARB. INT'L 241, 241-42 (1986) (noting that only
arbitration been released from the strictures of formal law).
id.
Paul Lagarde, Approach Critique de la Lex Mercatoria. in LL DROIT DES

RELATIONS FCONOMTQUES INTERNATIONALES, F1TUDESOFFERTES A BERTHOLI) GOLDIAN
[CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE lEX MERCATORIA, in LAW OF INTERNATIONAl. ECONOMIC
RLLATIONS-A STUDY OFFERED To BLRTHOLD GOLDMIAN] 125 (Philippe Fouchard et al.

eds., 1982).
34. See Alexander Court de Fontmrichel, L'ARBITRE, LE jU GE ET LES PRATIU1ES
ILLICITES DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL [THE ARBITRATOR, THE JLDGE. AND ILLICIT
PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE] 102 (2002).

35. SeePaul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1161-62
(2007) ("Given increased migration and global communication, it is not surprising that
people feel ties to, and act based on afliliations with, multiple communities in addition
to their territorial ones. Such corimunities may be ethnic, religious, or epistemic,
transnational, subnational, or international, and the norms asserted by such
communities frequently challenge territorially-based authority ....
Finally, we see
communities of transnational bankers developing their own law governing trade
finance and the use of modern forms of lex mercatoria to govern business relations. Such
non-state legal systems often influence (or are incorporated into) state or international
regimes.").
36. See Roger Cotterrell, Transnational Communities and the Concept of Law, 21
RATIO jURIS 1, 5-6 (2008) [hereinafter Cotterrell, Transnational Communties] ("The
many different kinds of transnational regulation which now cxist, or are developing,
relate to the interests, experiences, allegiances and values associated with transnational
networks of community: for example, transnational business and financial networks;
networks established and sustained by NGOs and social movements in environmental
and human rights fields; networks of production and distribution in particular
transnational industries (like that described in Snyder's toy industry study); networks
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the state hierarchy, exhibit manifestations of normativitv in their
structure, operation and organisation. As a result, the orthodox
juristic proposition that law can only derive from a single legal
and political system, namely the state, became increasingly
difficult
to
reconcile
with
the
reality
of
global
interdependence. 1 The
development of transnational
specialized communities, making a shift from a monist to a
pluralistic world, has critically changed our perception of
international law." As David Kennedy puts it, "the idea that
there is national law and international law, public law and
private law, and that the legal order is a tidy sum of the four, is
no longer plausible. It doesn't add up. We need a better map." 0
Indeed, the normative potency of non-state actors and the
articulation of informal legal norms have been increasingly
recognized by a number of international law scholars. 40 This
recognition grows out of scholarship that employs a range of
differing types of methodologies, frameworks of analysis and
lines of inquires. Some scholars, for example, have engaged with
legal theory to develop an analytical conceptual framework for a
facilitated by co-operation between states such as the EU. NAFTA, MERCOSUR; and
professional networks such as those involved in international commercial arbitration or
transnational lkgal practice."). Cf GRAIT-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH
CONSLNSUS AND RUNNING CODE, A THLORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAw 56 (2010)

(referring to "interest-driven" specialized groups which are functioning legal systems).
37. FRANCK, supra note 29, at 4; MiLLs, supra note 22, at 74; Cotterrell,
Transnational Communities. supra note 36, at 6.
38. Cf I)avid Kennedy, Turning a Market Democracy: A Tale of Two Architectures, 32
HARV. INT'L. L.J. 373, 375-76 (1991) ("[T]he old international law was hopelessly
comrpromrised by ideological strife and an overemnphasis on state sovereignty and

conflict. The new international law will begin where these leave off. Theoretically, that
eicans an end to the preoccupation with naturalism and positivisn and a move to a
mriore practical and pragmatic international law that can respond to the new problens
requiring international cooperation-the environment, health care, and so forth.
Doctrinally, this neans a nove away fron sovereignty and doctrines of procedure to a

renewal of substantive codification and a revitalization of international institutions.").
39. I)avid Kennedy, One. Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Plaralism and the
Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOc. CHANGE 641, 643 (2006) [hereinafter
Kennedy, Legal Pluralism].
40. Cf Braun, supra note 27, at 491-92 ("in international investment law,
globalization has caused the states to transforn their role as the guarantors of legal
certainty: states no longer cstablish law and order on their own but rather provide for
and guarantee the establishment of law and order through the provision of investorstate dispute settlement procedures. The rule-making process in international
investment law can -fourily-be
variety, choice, and ompeition." ).

comnpared to a marketplace and described in terims of
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better understanding of the normative function of non-state
actors and transnational rules.
Other scholars have employed socio-legal analysis to
identify non-state norms. 42 The most prominent school of
thought in this line of inquiry is that of legal pluralism, which
studies the normative potency of non-state transnational
communitiest Legal pluralists focus on communities4 4 that tend
to be highly technical and specialized and take the form of
networks, 4 or systems, 46 or diverse global societies. 4 These
41. ComTpare john Linarelli, AralticalJ1 isprudence and the Concept oj Commercial
Law, 114 PLNN ST. L. REV. 119, 193 (2009) (employing analytical methods to develop a
framework for international law), wit/h CAllTESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 36, at 56
(relying on the method of "rough consensus and running code" to develop an
analytical framework of transnational law); see Ross Cranston, Theorizing Transnational
Commercial Law, 42 TEX INT' L.J. 597, 602 (2007).
42. See EU GEN EHRLICH, iUNDAMENTAI PRINCIPLES OF THE SOClolMOCY OF IAw lix
(Roscoe Pound & Klaus Ziegert trans., 2002) ("At the present as well as at any other
time, the center of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic

science [Jurisprudenz], nor in judicial decision [Rechtsprechung], but in society itself.
This sentence, perhaps. contains the substance of every attempt to state the
fundamental principles of the sociology of law."). For Ehrlich, one of the pioneers of
empirical sociolegal analysis, law encompassed both state rules, found in statues and
judicial decisions. and non-state norms. Of course. the focus of Ehrlich's inquiry and
his living law theory was on local communities, whereas the subject of contemporary
pluralisin is global diverse communities and global law, but the principle of non-state
living law applies to a great extent even today. For further information on this topic
see Gunther Teubner, "Global Bukowina": Legal Plaralismin the World Society, in GLOBAL
LAW WITHOUT A STATE,

3

(Guntner Teubner ed., 1997).

43. Berman, supra note 35, at 1157-59.
44. See id. at 1157-58; see also Cotterrell, TransnationalConmunities, supra note 36,
at 5-6 (referring to transnational communities).
45. FRANCOIS OST & MICHLL VAN DE KLRCHOVL. DL LA PYRAMID AU RLSEAU? POUR
UNE THEORIE I)iALECTtQUE DU L)ROIT [FROM THE IYRAMID TO THE NETWORK: FOR A
I)TALECTICAL THEORYOF THE LAW] 14 (2002) (speaking about networks).

46. See Robert Wai. The lterlegalit of TransnationalPrivateLaw, 71 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 107, 110 (2008). W\ai also argues that the normative framework for
contemporary business transactions includes a variety of norms, coming from state and
non-state actors: "private law provides a useful corrective to a tendency in doctrinal-law
scholarship to focus on state norms, and the tendency in leading works of global legal
pluralism to emphasize nonstate normative orders." Id. at 109. What is particularly
interesting in his analysis is that he introduces a new theoretical framework for
understanding the normative lunctions of transnational private law and transnational
rules: this is the Systems theory, which is premised on the observation that "social
practices, rather than an abstract or ideal theoy of law, determine the boundaries of
normative systems." Id. at 112-13.
47. Tcubner, supra note 42, at 3 (" [S]ocial subsystcms have already begun to form
an authentic global society or, better, a fragmented multitude of diverse global
societies.").
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communities acquire normative powers and legal validation
through constant self-referencing processes and practices, 4 8
which the members of the community accept as binding (a
method often called autopoiesis).47 As Teubner points out, "the
new living law of the world is nourished not from stores of
tradition but from the ongoing self-reproduction of highly

technical, highly specialized, often formally organized and
rather narrowly defined, global networks of an economic,
cultural, academic or technological nature."5
Although views favoring formalism and the exclusivity of
state law still persist in international legal scholarship, the
movement of legal pluralism and anti-formalism have crucially
48. BOAVENTURA DL SOUSA SANTOS. TOWARD A NEw LEGAL COMMON SENSE 437

(2d ed. 2002) (speaking about "normative interlegality"). "These groups tend to selfregulate crucial aspects of their business and non-business activities through
reconunendations, best practices, guidelines, codes of conduct, and seif-regulation. See
CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 36, at 2; f jan Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and Their
Manifestation: The Operation of the InternationalCommercial and FinancialLegal Order and
its Lex Mercatoria.,24 BLRKELEYJ. INTL L. 129. 147 (2006) (noting that laws must have a
"self-propelling force to maintain itself"); David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of
Regulatory Capitalism,598 ANNALS AM. CAD. POL. & SOc. SC. 12, 27 (2005) ("The new
order

of

regulatory

capitalism ...

is

characterized

by ...formalization

of inter-

institutional and intra-institutional relations and the proliferation of mechanisms of
scif-regulation in the shadow of the state . . . .").
49. The teri "autopoicsis" was originally introduced by HumberLto Maturana.
Humberto Maturana, Autopoiesis, in AU TOPEISiS: THEORY OF THE LIVNG ORGANTSATION
(Milan Zeleny ed., 1981). The concept of the autopoietic law has since been revisited
and partially transformed by a number of scholars, most notably, Niklas Luhmann.
LU HMANN, supra note 21. For a good overview and discussion of autopoietic law, see
the collection of articles in GUNTHER TEUBNER, AUTOPOTETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH
To LAW AND SOCIETY (1987), and in particular, see Teubner, supra note 42, at 1. In his
work GLOBAL BUKOVINA, Teubner refers to the "closed circuit arbitration" which is "a
secf-regulatory contract which goes far beyond one particular commercial transaction
and establishes a whoic private legal order with a claim to global validity. Apart fromn

substantive rules it contains clauses that refer conflicts to an arbitration 'court' which is
identical with the private institution that was responsible for 'legislating' the model
contract." TEUBNER, supra note 42. at 15."
50. TEUBNER, supra note 42, at 5. See KOSKENNTEMT, supra note 21, at 354 (noting
that it leads to a situation where law and regulation are indistinguishable and therefore
it leaves us "unable to distinguish between the gunman and the policeman, the regimc
corruption from the regime of contract", and also as a "generalising doctrine wvith an
ambivalent political significance." A similar approach is taken by Horatia Muir-Watt,
who argues that legal pluralism is inadequate to address the lkgitimiacy problem raised
by transnational expressions of non-state authority. Horatia Muir-Watt, Private
International Law: Beyond the Schism, from Closet to Planet (launching paper of the
research

project

Private Iiternational

Law

as Global Governance),

available at

http://blogs.sciences-po.fr/pilagg/iles/2012,/03,/HMW-PILAGG-Paper-FINAI .pdl).
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affected the concept of contemporary international law.A In a
pluralistic world, there is no single fundamental test for legal
norms, and there are different systems, both state and non-state
ones that engage in the development of a variety of legal norms.
Such a concept of law pays particular attention to content rather
than pedigree and recognizes the important role of legal
principles and other standards such as policies and practices.2
Legal norms developed informally are more suitable to
explain how social and business activities are organized and
regulated in our multi-layered contemporary world." We now
realize for example that "ISO 14000 environmental standards
are forced through the supply chain by private ordering,
whether or not they correspond to national regulations." 4 Our
understanding of normativity gradually extends beyond the
picture of law as a system that comprises only of rules, which as
Dworkin observes has for long "exercised a tenacious hold on
our imagination, perhaps through its very simplicity. If we shake
ourselves loose from this model of rules, we may be able to build
a model truer to the complexity and sophistication of our own
practices."5
51.

See, e.g:, KOSKENNTEMI, supra note 21, at 214 (arguing in favor of formalism in

international
law): JEAN D'ASPREMONT,
FORMALISM
AND THE SOU RCES OF
INTLRNATIONAL LAW - A THLORY OF THL ASCLRTAIMLNT OF LEGAL RULS (2011)
(arguing that a formal theory of sources remains instrumental in ascertaining rules of
international law); Thomas Schultz, Some Critical Comments on the juridicity of Lex

Mercatoria. 10 Y.B. OF PRIv. INT'L L. 667 (2008) (arguing that lex mercatoria lacks the
formal requirements which are essential features of a legal system).
52. The binding force of legal principles and policies was demonstrated by Ronald
Dworkin, another Contemporary scholar who convincingly attached positivism as a legal
theory that accepts only state rules as law. In TAKING RIGHTS SERIOL SIY, Dworkin shows

that lkgal rules enacted by states are not the only possible lgal rules: legal principles
and policies have normative force as well See generall RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOL SIN (1977).

53. Cottcrrell, TransnationalCommunities, supra note 36, at 4-5 ("The task is rathier
to rethink legal thcoly in a situation in which it is slowly losing its basic modern
reference points, the firmly defined jurisdiction of the nation state and the politically
organized national society as the terrain from which all legal phenomena can be
observed and evaluated. Perhaps, indeed. there can no longer be a single legal
reference point to provide the basis for jurisic thought.").
54. Kennedy, Legal Pluralism,supra note 39. at 642.
55. DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 45. See Cotterrell. TransnationalCommunities, supra
note 36, at 10 (" [J]uristic legal theory needs to knock away the support on which it has
been leaning since the rise of modern lkgal positivism ... [which assumes] that all law
is created by the state or derives authority and validity from its recognition by agencies

of the state, and that its guarantee is its enforceability by the state.").
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It is important to note that the realization of the role and
significance of non-state legal norms does not suggest the
eradication of state. The majority of scholars unequivocally
accept the importance of state law and state order.56 The above
observations simply highlight that contemporary societies are
highly diverse, and multidimensional, and recognize the
authority of both state and non-state actors. Equally important,
the above observations suggest that our understanding of law
has irrevocably advanced from the Austinian thesis that law can
only be rules backed by threats57 to a more inclusive and
pluralistic concept of international law that accepts both regal
rules produced formally by states, and legal standards developed
in non-state communities, in the form of principles, policies and
norms.58 Of course, much of this discussion is not new. Theories
on the evolution of norms outside and beyond the formal
sources and processes of states have received more attention
since the Second World War and they are currently enjoying
almost mainstream recognition. 59 What is new, however, is
whether the developments in international legal scholarship and
56. CALLIESS & ZUMBANSLN, supra note 36. at 19 ("[T]he many examplcs of a
'global law without a state' [does] not in fact contain a flat-out rejection of state-based,
official law. Rather, examples such as corporate codes of conduct or privately enacted
rules in transnational commercial arbitration can be seen as underscoring the
increasing complexity of a legal order the building blocks of which originate in
regulatory processes that are no longer confined to government actors nor to nationstate alone."). See Cotterrell, Transnational Communities, supra note 36, at 10 ("A useful
pluralist concept of law wvould be one that can recognize the current (and probably
enduring) prominence of statC law but not assume that all law must conform to or be
measured against the state law model, or exist in inevitable subordination to or
dependence on the law of the state.").
57. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, 13-16
(1954).
58. Even Hart wvas open to the idea of international law. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAw 235 (2d ed. 1994) (observing that there is no need to search for a
basic law (a Grundnorm) in intrcnational law, and while we can resign to the idea that
international law may not be a system of legal rules, it can wvell qualify as set of legal
rules.) There is no need to look for analogies between international law and municipal
law it terms of form (because the analogies are too thin) but he accepts that there are
important analogies in terms of function and content: "the analogies of content consist
in the range of principles, concepts, and methods which are common to both
municipal and international law, and make the lawyers' technique freely transferable
from the one to the other." Id.

59. See Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68
MOD. L. RLV. 1 at 5-11 (2005)

without state).

(identifying the different attempts to represent law
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international law affected international arbitration. The
following parts discuss this matter in detail. Part II explains how
arbitration scholarship failed to connect with crucial theoretical
developments
in
international
legal scholarship
and
international law. Part III identifies the consequences of failing
to connect with developments in international legal scholarship
and international law. Lastly, Part IV discusses how the
developments in international legal scholarship can be used to
advance an autonomous concept of international arbitration
law.
II. HOWARBITRATION SCHOLARSHIP FAILED TO C OANECT
IWTH THE DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
While the scope of international legal scholarship has been
expanding and the concept of international law has been
progressing, the field of international arbitration has largely
developed in isolation.
Due to its close relevance to legal practice, arbitration was
not originally considered a subject of academic importance.
Arbitration courses, therefore, were not included in generalist
law degrees (like J.D. or LL.B. programs) or in LL.M.
curricula.o At best, arbitration was considered a subordinate
legal subject. For example, in Germany and in a number of
other German influenced jurisdictions, such as Austria, the
Netherlands, Greece, and Italy, arbitration has mainly been
treated as procedural law; this explains why arbitration laws are

60. It was only in the ind 1980's that arbitration was first taught as a post-graduate
course. In 1985, Queen Mary University of London ("QMUL ") introduced the course
of International and Comparative Commercial Arbitration in its LL.M. curriculum,
mainly thanks to the vision and efforts of two very influential commercial lawyers,
professor Julian Lew, who first developed and taught the course at QMUL, and
Professor Roy Goode, who was the Director of the Centre for Commercial Law Studies
at QMNIUL at the timc. It took another fifteen years until arbitration courses were
introduced in the II .M. curricula of other academic institutions in the UK (e.g., King's
College London, University College London. London School of Economics), in
Switzerland (c.g., University of Geneva), in Swcdcn [there is no example here- maybe
this should be deleted], and the United States (e.g., Columbia University, New York
University, University of Texas at Austin, Penn State University, University of Miami,
Pcppcrdine University, Hainline University). Arbitration is still not included in most
IL.B. orJ.D. programmes.
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still included in their national codes of civil procedure. 61
Moreover, in France and Switzerland, arbitration has been
viewed as private international law or conflicts of laws subjectb6
and in the common law world, arbitration has traditionally been
treated as a version of ordinary contract law.63 This explains why
scholarly work in arbitration largely drew on theories, concepts,
and doctrines of private international law, civil procedure, and
contract law.64
Since arbitration was not taught in law schools and
scholarly work treated arbitration as a subordinate subject,
international arbitration never organically developed as an
autonomous legal discipline. In fact, arbitration scholarship
grew not in law schools or the academic world.6 The most
61. See ZITPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIATi. PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [B(B1.] 3202, § 1025-66 (Ger.); ZTVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO]

[CIVIL PROCEDURE STATUTE] § 577-618 (Austria); Wetbock van Burgerlijke
Rechtsvordering [Rv] [Code of Civil Procedure] § 1020-76 (Neth.); Codice di
procedura civile [C.p.p.] [Code of Civil Procedure] § 806-40 (It.); KODITKS POLITiKES
DIKONOMIAS [KPOL.D.] [Code of Civil Procedure] 1:806-903 (Grecce). In Greece. Law
2735/1999 governs arbitration procedures, wvith the arbitration provisions of the Greek
Code of Civil Procedure applying on an ancillary basis. See Nonos (2735/1999)
Diethnis Emporiki DiaLisia [International Commercial Arbitration] EPHEMERIS TLS
KYTRNESEOS TES HFiENIKFS DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 1999, A: 167 (Greece).
62. See Bundesgesetz uber das Internationale Privatrecht [CPIL] [Codc on Private
International Law], Dec. 18. 1987. at 176-94 (Switz.) (codifying German international
arbitration law within the Code on Private International Law). While French arbitration
law is included in the French Code of Civil Procedure, international arbitration law is
part of the country's private international law. See CODE DL PROCEDURE CIVILL [C.P.C.]
art. 1442-1507 (Fr.) (codifying French arbitration laws in the Code of CiviI Procedure);
INTERNATIONAL
CONMMERCIAL
see generally FoUCHARD GATILARD GOLDIMAN,
ARBITRATION (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savagc cds., 1999) (providing a conflict of
laws analysis of arbitration).
63. See DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON, JUDITH GIT & MATTHEW GEARING, RUSSELL ON
ARBITRATION 3:2 (23d ed. 2008) (discussing arbitration provisions in English contract
law); Thomas-CSF v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that "[a]rbitration is contractual by nature" in the United States); McAllister
Bros., Inc. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a "party
may be bound to an arbitration agreement in the United States if so dictated by the
"ordinary principles of contract and agency").
64. See generally FOUCHARD LT AL., supra note 62: BERNARD HANOTIAU COMPLEX
ARBITRATIONS:

MUI TTPARTY,

MULTICONTRACT,

MULTi-ISSUE

AND

CLASS

ACTIONS

(2005).
65. With the exception of very few older pioneer scholars of international law,
such as Andreas Lowenfeld, Hans Smit, and Philippe Fouchard, who wrote extensively
on arbitration, full-time academics who focus extensively on arbitration law is a
relevantly recent phenomenon. For examplc, look to the works of US Professors

George Berman at Columbia University, Thomas Carbonneau and Catherine Rogers at
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influential works in arbitration law were produced by lawyers
who were mainly practizing in the field of arbitration, as counsel
or arbitrators, often as both.66 However, practicing arbitration
lawyers were not concerned with the concept or legal theory of
arbitration or how socio-legal jurisprudence may relate to the
subject of arbitration. Their focus was on scholarship that would
directly respond to the problems they were facing in arbitration
practice. Their methods of inquiry were not empirical, scientific,
contextual or interdisciplinary; their primary method of analysis
was the traditional approach taken for legal research, namely
doctrinal analysis that focuses exclusively on legal statutes and
case law.
This is not to argue that the field of arbitration remained
undeveloped. On the contrary, a wealth of doctrinal work and a
series of pro-arbitration decisions of national courts at the
highest level greatly expanded the scope of arbitration's
authority. 7 International tribunals are now considered capable
of trying a wide range of disputes, even disputes implicating
national public policy that previously fell within the exclusive
domain of state courts.

Penn State University, William Park at Boston University, Alan Scott Rau at University
of Texas, Linda Silberman and Franco Ferrari at New York University, Christophei
Drazohal at the University of Kansas,Jack Coe and Thornas Stipanowich at Pepperdine
University, and Susan Franck at Washington & Lee University. In Europe, look at the
works of Professors Klaus Peter Berger at the University of Cologne, Loukas Mistelis at

Queen
Charles

Mary University of London, Patricia Shaughnessy at Stockholm University,
and Catherine Kessedjian at Panthcon-Assas, and Thomas Clay at the

Jarrosson

University of Versailles.
66. See JULIAN D.M. LWF, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: A STUDY IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARDS (Kenneth R. Simmonds

ed., Oceana publications, Inc. 1978). Julian Lew was for rnost of his career working as a
practicing arbitration lawyer in English law firms and was a visiting Professor in Queen
Mary University of London. Similarly, all major arbitration works have been produced
by arbitration lawyers who mainly practice arbitration. See generally ALBERTJAN VAN DEN
BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, TOWARDS A UNIFORM
JUDICIAI INTERPRETATION (1981); W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WTILIA\1 W. PARK & JAN
PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBLR OF (OMMLRCL ARBITRATION (3d ed.. 2000);
J LTAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN KROi, COMPARATIVT INTERNATIONAL
COMMLRCIAL ARBITRATION (2003); HANOTIAU,
supra note 64; GARY BORN,
INTLRNATIONAL COMMERCLAL ARBITRATION: (OMMLNTARY AND MATERIALS (2d ed..
2001); REDFERN AND1-UNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (5th ed., 2009).
67. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc, 473 U.S. 614
S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
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In the area of commercial arbitration, for example, it is now
accepted that tribunals have authority to determine not only
commercial claims pertaining to the formation, interpretation,
and performance of a commercial contract, but also statutory
claims that may have crucial social implications or involve public
policy.68 Although in most domestic legal systems a number of
areas, such as disputes that have criminal implications, or
disputes concerning legal matters of personal status, remain
non-arbitrable, the authority of commercial tribunals now
extends over disputes relating to intellectual property, antitrust
claims, or tax claims.69
Meanwhile, in the area of investment treaty arbitration, a
significant number of international investment treaties have
adopted arbitration as the preferred model for the resolution of
public international law disputes. These disputes would
normally fall within the regulatory sovereignty of the host
nation, 70 even disputes on sovereign debt bonds.7'

68. See Thomas E. Carbonneau & Francois Janson, Cartesian Logic and Frontier
Politics: French and American Concepts ofArbitrability, 2 TLL.J. INTL & COMP. L. 193. 196
(1994) (discussing the types of issues arbitration tribunals decide).
69. See generally ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

(Loukas A. Mistelis & Stavros L. Brckoulakis eds., 2009). These developments in
arbitration doctrine and practice have encouraged some arbitration scholars to declare
the death of non-arbitrability doctrine, arguing that now any type of public policy
dispute may be submitted to arbitration. See, e.g., Karim Youssef, The Death of
Inarbitrabiity, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMNPARATIVT PERSPECTIVES, 47,
47 (Loukas A. Mistclis & Stavros L. Brckoulakis eds., 2009) ("In recent years, the scope
of rights amenable to arbitration has grown to such an extent that, the concept of
arbitrability (or its mirror image, inarbitrability) as central as it may be to arbitration

theory, has virtually died in real arbitral life.").
70. See generall (AMPBLLL MCL.ACHLAN

QC,

LALRLNCE SHORL & MATTHEW
WEINIGER, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTINT PRINCIPLES (2007); VAN
HARTEN, INVTESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW supra note 1; R10DOT
DOLZLR & CHRISTOPH SCHRELILR, PRINCIPLLS OF INTLRNATIONAL INVLSTMENT LAW
OF INTERNATIONAI
THE MUITIATERALIZATION
(2008); STEPHAN W. SCHIL,
INVESTMENT LAW (2009); ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LUIS PARADETI.,

INVLSTMENT

TRLATIES:

STANDARDS

OF

TREATMENT

(2009);

LAW AND PRACTICE OF

cf

also

Campbell

McLachlan, Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework, in 50 YEARS OF THF NEW
YORK CONVENTION: IC(A INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE (IC(A Congress

series no. 14) 95 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., Kluwer 2009) for a good overview of role
and function of investment treaty arbitration.

71. See Abaclat v. Aigentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (using arbitration to settic
a dispute over a sovereign debt bond unrelated to a specific project in the host state-

in this case borrowing).
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However, and notwithstanding the fact that the scope of
authority of international tribunals was expanding in practice,
the main focus of arbitration scholarship remained narrow. The
agenda of arbitration scholarship and conferences in the last
forty years has been dominated by practically oriented topics,
such as the validity of arbitration agreements, the power of
tribunals to provide interim relief, the role of non-signatories in
arbitration, and procedural matters including the taking of
evidence, enforcement of arbitral awards, and cost-control and
effective case management of arbitration proceedings.
Similarly, the current arbitration zeitgeist is the use of thirdparty funding in international arbitration, the appropriate
standards of impartiality of tribunals, and the conduct of
counsel before tribunals.
The only progressive movement in arbitration scholarship
that appeared to have implications on legal theory was the
theory of delocalization that emerged in the 1980's from the
seminal papers of William Park and Jan Paulsson. Transnational
arbitration, it was argued, is a delocalized legal system that is not
subject to the national law (procedural or substantive) or the
national courts of the seat of the arbitration (often referred to as
lex loci arbitri).
This was an interesting proposition that injected a breath of
progressive air in arbitration scholarship, which however proved
ephemeral. Instead of engaging with legal theory, the discourse
on delocalisation descended to a trite debate on why the parties
to an arbitration choose the arbitration seat. Opponents of the
theory of delocalization argued that the parties to an arbitration
effectively submit to the national legal system of the seat by
choosing to arbitrate in a certain state; therefore, arbitration can

72. By way of illustration only, one can look into the agenda and proceedings of
the most influential arbitration conference, organized by the International Committee
of Commercial Arbitration and held biannually.
73. See generally William Park, The Lex Loci Aibitri and International Commercial
Arbitration, 32 INTL & COMP. LQ. 21 (1983); William Park & Jan Paulsson, The Binding
Force oJ International Arbitral Awards, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 253 (1983); jan Paulsson,
Arbitration Unbound: Aiard Detachedfrom the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INTL &
COMP. L.Q. 358 (1981); Jan Paulsson, Delocalisation of International Commercial
Arbitration When and Why It viat es, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 53 (1983).
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never be truly autonomous.74 Proponents of the delocalization
theory argued that the parties choose a seat mainly for practical
reasons, such as whether a seat is close to the evidence of the
case or to the headquarters of the parties. 7Therefore, the
parties never submit to the laws of the state where they arbitrate;
rather, arbitration is only nominally linked with the national
legal system of the seat, and in essence remains delocalized and
autonomous.
That being the essence of the debate, it is no wonder that
the theory of 'delocalization' has effectively made no
meaningful progress in the last twenty years. The conflict-of-laws
argument of 'reformist' arbitration lawyers that as opposed to
national courts, international tribunals have no forum and
therefore they owe no allegiance to the laws of the seat always
sounded more axiomatic and descriptive than cogent, and in
any event it never really advanced the argument in favor of an
autonomous
arbitration system. Indeed, developing a
proposition that arbitration is delocalized and autonomous of
any national legal system would require the construction of a
general theory of arbitration law that is both normative and
conceptual and purports to demonstrate arbitration's normative
potency.
However, arbitration scholarship never seized on such a
challenge. Apart from the recent interest in investment treaty
arbitration, which has prompted some arbitration scholars to
look into issues beyond arbitration doctrine, 76 arbitration
scholarship never fully engaged with the crucial movements and
theories of international legal scholarship that advanced the
concept of international law. Interdisciplinary research on the
74. See Noah Rubins, The Arbitral Seat is No Fiction: A Brief Reply to Tatsuya
Nakamura's Commentary, 'The Place of Arbitration in InternationalArbitration' Its Fictitious
Nature and Lex Arbitri, 16 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. RLP. 12 (2001).
75. Tetsuya Nakamura, The Place of Arbitration in International Arbitration- Its
Fictitious Nature and Lex Arbitri, 15 MEAL.FY'S INT. ARB. REP. 11 (Oct. 2000); Philippe
Pinsolic, Parties to an InternationalArbitration With the Seat in France are at Full Liberty to
Organise the Procedure (is They See Fit, 16 MEALEY'S INT. ARB. REP. 30 (2001).
76. Some scholars for examplc have been looking into the impact of human rights
on

arbitration. See

HUMAN

RIGHTS

IN

INTLRNATIONAL

IJNVESTMLNT

LAW

AND

ARBITRATION 65 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernest-Ulrich Petersnann, & Francesco
Francioni eds., Oxford University Press 2009); see also Jaies Fry, InternationalHuman
Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law's Unity. 18 DIKL
CONMP. & INT'L L 77 (2007).

J.
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Law and Arbitration movement did not appear in arbitration
scholarship, and arbitration law was never critically examined
through the prism of political theory, international affairs or
economics.
More crucially, arbitration scholarship failed to critically
engage with legal theory and socio-legal jurisprudence. With the
exception of a small number of French theorists, the majority of
arbitration scholars77 paid little to no attention to such subjects.
Legal theory for example was often regarded as an academic
"tempest in a teapot"7 or a discussion with "few practical
ramifications" that "ignores or at least do not fully accord with
what happens in the real world of international commercial
arbitration."79
By failing to engage with non-arbitration and non-legal
scholarship and by focusing exclusively on doctrinal analysis,
arbitration theory was largely developed under "delusions of
self-sufficiency as a science of law"."1 This does not suggest that
doctrinal analysis is unimportant. On the contrary, examining
the internal structure of legal arguments and propositions is
crucial to the coherence of arbitration theory. However,
arbitration discourse should not be interested only in legal
propositions that have the status of formal law; it should also be
interested in informal arbitration norms and practices. It should

77. See generally DANIEL COHEN. ARBITRAGE LT SOCIETE [ARBITRATION AND
SOCIETY](1993);
BRUN-NO
OPPETIT, THEORIE DE
L'ARBITRAGE
[ARBITRATION
THEORY] (1998); E. LOQUIN, L'APPLICATION DES REGLES NATIONALES DANS L'ARBITRAGE
COMMRCIAL INTERNATIONAL, IN L'APPORT DL LAJLRISPRUDLNCL ARBITRALL[APPLYIN(,
A-NATIONAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRADE ARBITRATION, in THE
CONTRIBUTION OF ARBITRATION CASES] 87 (1986). More recently, for influential work,
see EMMANUEL GAILLARD, ASPLCTS PHILOSOPHIQUES Du DROIT DL LARBITRAGE
INTERNATIONAL
[PHILISOPHICAL, ASPECTS
OF THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION] (2008), translated in LEGAL THEORYOF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 59

(2010)). For a sociological analysis in English, see YVLS DLZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH,
DEALING IN VIRTUE (1996) (undertaking empirical research on international
arbitration), see SchultLz, supra note 51, at 694-95; see also Thomas SchultLz, The Concept of
Law in Transnational Arbitral Legal Orders and its Consequences, 2(1) J. INT. DISP.
SETTLEMENT 59 (2011); cf Paolo Esposito & Jacopo Martire, Arbitrating in a World of
Communicative Reason, 28 ARB. INT'L 325, 328 (2012) (relying on the work of Haberinas'
theories to examine the concept of international arbitration).
78. THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF

ARBITRATION 624 (6th ed. 2012); See LEw. MISTLLIS & KR(LL, supra not 66, at para. 5-5
79. See LLW LT AL., supra no[C 66, at paras. 5-5, 5-7.
80. See Cotterrell, Edge ofEmpbie, supra note 3.
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equally be interested in what arbitration law means
actors. As the following two sections argue, the
expectations and consciousness of arbitration
crucially relevant to the development of a

[Vol. 36:745
to the actual
experiences,
lawyers are
concept of

autonomous arbitration law."'

111. THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OFARBITR4TION'S FAILURE TO
ENGAGE WITH CRUCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERI-4 TIOA4L LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
The failure of arbitration scholarship to engage with crucial
movements and theories of international legal scholarship has
had undesirable implications for the field of arbitration in two
ways.
First, it has engendered an unfavorable perception of
international arbitration by non-arbitration lawyers and by the
public. By failing to engage with interdisciplinary research and
the concerns of non-arbitration and non-legal scholarship,
arbitration lawyers have failed to develop a broader and more
accessible account of international arbitration. Naturally,
arbitration has lately been the subject of harsh critique by nonarbitration scholars who fear, not always justifiably, that
international tribunals unduly interfere with the state's ability to
protect the values, traditions and interests of the public.12
Although it is critical for the future of arbitration, this type of

81.

Cf Cotterrell, Edge ojEpire, supra note 3, at 77. As Ehrlich has famously

noted in the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, -[t]he center of
gravity of kgal development therefore from time immemorial has not lain in the
activity of the state but in society itself, and must be sought there at the present time."
EU GEN EHRIICH, FUNDAMENTAlx
PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW/ 390 (Walter L

Moll trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1962) (1932).
82. See CUTLER, supra note 24, at 183 ("The devolution of authority to resolve
disputes and to enforce agreements to the private sphere through the increasing
legitimacy of private arbitration, and the reassertion of merchant autonomy as the
substantive norm are perfecting this reconfiguration of political authority. This is
reordering state-society relations both locally and globally"). Cuter also notes that
arbitration and lex mrcatoria should be tackled on the field of repre sentation and
legitimacy to avoid "a 'hegemonic in the Gramscian sense' influence" of the
"mercatocracy." Id.; Barnali Choudhuly, Recapturing Public Power: Is Iwestment
Arbitration's Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41
vAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775 (2008).
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unfavourable implications is not the focus of this work, and it is
examined elsewhere. 8 3
Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this
article, the failure of arbitration to engage with the
developments in international legal scholarship has crucially
impaired the concept and autonomy of arbitration law. By
remaining adherent to an old-fashioned version of positivism
that accepts state legal rules only, arbitration scholarship has
failed to advance an account of arbitration as a non-state
community that has the capacity to produce non-state legal
rules. Eventually, it has failed to advance persuasive claims of
normativity and autonomy of international arbitration.8 4
Naturally thus arbitration and arbitration law is largely
treated as subservient to national courts and to the national laws
of the seat. Indeed, with few only exceptions, mainstream
83. See Stavros Brekoulakis, Collective Biases and International Tribunals I (Queen
Mary Univ. of London. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 131, 2013).
84. There are notable exceptions here; see. for example, Julian D. M. Lew,
Acieving the Dream: Aut nomous Abitration, 22 ARB. INT'. 179, 186 (2006), (putting
forward an appealing vision of an autonomous arbitration system, based however
exclusively on doctrinal method of analysis). Gary Born has also advanced a
comprehensive account of international arbitration as a global systern designed around
the 1958 New York Convention in his treatise of two volunes and 3,398 pages. GARY
BORN, INTERNATIONAL CONMLRCIAL ARBITRATION (2009); see in particular Chapter 1,

where he lays down the foundations of the system and Chapter 26 where he explores
issues of preclusion, lis pendens and stare decisis in intLernational arbitration.
85. French (and Frecnch influenced) scholars were the first to introduce the
notion of arbitration as an autonomous system. See Charalambos Fragistas, Arbitrage
Etranger et Arbitriae 1nternational en Droit Prive [Foreign Arbitration and International
Aibitration in Private Law], 49 RLV. CRIT. DIP 1 (1960); Berthold Goldman, Les Conflits
de Lois dans lArbitrage International de Droit Priod [Conflicts of Law in International
Aibitration of Private Law], 109 COLLECTE) COURSES 347 (1963); Philippe Fouchard,
LARBITRAGE

CONIMLRCIAL

ARBITRATION] (1965).

INTLRNATIONAL

[INTLRNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

From Anglo-Saxon scholars, Julian Lew was one of the first to

theorize on the autonomous nature of arbitration. JULIAN LEW, APPiLICABLE LAW IN
INTLRNATIONAL COIMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1978). Julian Lew has also reiterated his

original thesis of autonomous nature of arbitration. Lew, supra note 84. Gaillard has
more recently engaged in the study of theory of transnational arbitration. which,
according to him, constitutes an autonomous legal order which although eventually
derives its legal order from the will of the States, it is still an autonomous system that is
shaped by the "convergence of national lkgal orders that, through their widespread
acceptance of arbitration, legitimizes its existence." Gaillard. supra note 77. at 59. See
EMMANU'EL GAILLARD, THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN IN FRNA)TIONAl COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION. 4 ICCA Congress Series 283 (1989); see also Einmanucl Gaillard. General
Principles of Law-MVore predictable after all?, 55 N.Y.L.J. 3 (2001). What is probably
missing from Gaillard's otherwise erudite studies on the theory of arbitration is
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arbitration theory and practice rests upon two main theses: first,
arbitration is derivative of national laws, and secondly, state

public policy defines the material scope of arbitration.8 6 Even
the term and concept of international arbitration is considered
a "misnomer," which does not exist in the legal sense, "as "every
arbitration is a national arbitration, that is to say, subject to a
specific system of national law. '87 Tribunals are therefore subject
to the national laws and national courts of the arbitration seat.88
This approach is echoed in the current legal framework of
arbitration, which is controlled by state laws and state public
policy. For a start, the 1958 United Nations Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the
greatest pillar of the arbitration edifice and the main force
behind the meteoric rise of arbitration in the last fifty years,
refers

to

foreign

rather

than

international

awards.

More

importantly, it expressly provides in Article V(2) (a) that
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be
refused if "the subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of [the enforcing]
country." " In similar fashion, paragraph (b) of the same

information from socio-legal analysis, which is necessary when we try to ascertain
normativity of any social or business community.
86. See. e.g., JEAN-FRAN(OTS POUDRET & SfBASTIEN BESSON, COIPARATIT, LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 83 (2d ed., 2007) (noting that " [t]he lex arbitribuilds the

foundation (Grundnorm) for the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement."); Stavros
Brekoulakis, Law Applicable to Arbitrability: Revisiting the Revisited Lex Fori, in
ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTITS 101 (Loukas Mistelis

& Stavros Brekoulakis eds., 2009) (discussing in detail and from a doctrinal perspective,
applicable laws issues in arbitration, and argues against the relevance of the lex fori and
state public policy when arbitrators as well as national courts deciding the issuc of
material scope of a private tribunal.); see generail Stavros Brekoulakis, Arbitrabiity and
Conflict o Jurisdictions: The (dimnishing Relevance of lex foni and lex loc arbiti, in
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

(Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kroell

eds., 2011).
87. Mann, supra note 31, at 245; Schultz, supra note 51 (criticizing lex mercatoria as
lacking a clear conceptual framework).

88. Mann, supra note 31, at 245 (pointing out that any source and power of
arbitration comes exclusively from national state and municipal law: "[e]very right or
power a private person enjoys is inexorably conferred by or derived from a system of
municipal law which may conveniently and in accordance with tradition be called the
lex fori, though it would be more exact (but also less familiar) to speak of the lex arbitri
or, in French, la loi de I'arbitrage.").
89. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral

Awards, art. 5(2) (a),

july 6,

1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
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provision states that enforcement of an arbitral award will also
be refused if the "recognition of enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of [the enforcing]
country." 9o The same approach is taken by the European
Convention on International Commercial arbitration' and by
the vast majority of national arbitration laws.
Almost every international and national legislation on
arbitration is underpinned by the idea that an arbitration must

be anchored in a state, and that a national law must govern all
aspects of the arbitration process.9
As an English court observed:
Indeed, English law at least has turned its face against the
notion that it is possible to have arbitral procedures that are
wholly unconnected with any national systern of law at
all... [B]y choosing the legal place of the arbitration
proceedings the parties ipso facto choose the laws of that
place to govern their arbitration proceedings . . . .93

90. Id. at art. 5(2) (b).
91. See European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961,
art. 6, para. 2, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364, (stating that "[t]hc courts may also
refuse recognition of the arbitration agreement if under the law of their country the
dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration.").
92. More crucially, national laws (invariably the law of the seat) determine the
scope of authority of international tribunals and whether a dispute can be submitted to
arbitration or not. E.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Connercial
Ai bitration, Ar t. 34(2) (b) (i) (stating that "thc subject matter of the dispute is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of this State," i.e. the lex fori).
National courts have been consistently applying the lex fori and the public policy of the
formn when looking into the issue of arbitrability. See, e.g., Fincanticri-Cantieri Navali
Ialiani SpA v. Ministry of Defence, Armament and Supply Directorate of Iraq, App.
1994, XXI Y.B. Comm. Aib. 594 (1996), where Italian courts applied Italian law to
determine whether a dispute concerning rights affected by United Nations and
European embargo legislation could be submitted to arbitration, as the parties had
originally agreed. For further analysis and references on this point, see GARY BORN,
INTLRNATIONAL COMMLRCAL ARBITRATION 521 (2009) for a comprehensive overview

of decisions from various national courts, including Belgian, Dutch, French, Italian,
Swiss, and US decisions, which all hold that the issue of material scope of an arbitration
will be determined by national laws by reference to the law of seat. There are only a few
exceptions to that approach. See e.g:, Meadows Indemnity v. Baccala & Shoop Ins.
Scivs., 760 F. Supp. 1036, 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the question of whether a
claim about fraud, implicating public policy issues, can be the subject matter of
arbitration is not to be determined by a national law; rather it must be made "on an
international scale, with reference to the laws of the countries party to the
Conve nion.) ".
93.

Union of Indiav. McDonnell Douglas [ 1993] 2 Lrovo)'s REP. 48.
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Any legislative or judiciary attempt in the past to challenge
the reign of national laws over arbitration spectacularly failed.
For example, in 1985 Belgium enacted a law providing that
national courts will have no jurisdiction to review an arbitral
award issued by a tribunal sitting in Belgium, when the dispute
was between two non-Belgian parties.94 This was a progressive
arbitration law allowing tribunals not to take into account
Belgian law or its state public policy when deciding a dispute
with international elements. Unfortunately, it was a short-lived
arbitration law. Not long after its enactment, it became the
subject matter of considerable criticism 95 and it has now been
amended by law reinstating the default right of Belgian national
courts to review all awards where the seat of arbitration is in
Belgium .96
Another example is the 1980 decision of the Paris Court of
Appeal in General National Maritime Transport Co. v. Socidt6
G6taverken Arendal.? Here, arbitration took place in Paris under
the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, between a
Libyan and a Swedish party concerning a dispute arising out of a
94. The expectation here was that Belgium would become an attractive (anational) place to arbitrate. See Alain Vandereist, Increasing the Appeal of Belgium as An
International Arbitration Forum? The Belgian Law of March 27, 1985 Concerning the
Annulment ofArbitralAwards, 3J. INT'LARB. 77 (1986).
95. William Laurence Craig, Uses and Abuses of Appeal From Awards, 4 ARB. INT'l
201 (1988) (recognizing that court review of arbitral awards should be limited, while
opposing the idea of national awards, noting that " [t] he existence of such a possibility,
however, means that the road to non-appealable arbitral awards may not be paved with
gold. Indeed, among some commentators, the concept of a non-revicwablc award
attracts the kind of contempt that was felt some years ago for divorces from Las Vegas
or Chihuahua").
96. This would apply except if the parties have expressly agreed to waive this right.
The legislation was amended in 1999 and then recently in 2013 with the current
lielgian judicial Code providing that "[t]he parties may, through an express
declaration in the arbitration agreement or through a later agreement, exclude any
action for the annulment of an arbitrator's award when neither of them is either a
natural person with a lielgian citizenship or a residence in Helgium, or a legal person
having its main establishment or having a branch there." Belgian Code Judiciaire [C.
Jud.] art. 1718. Similar provisions can be found in Swiss Private International Law Act,
art. 192, and the new French Law, art. 1522, which provides that "[b]y way of a specific
agreement the parties may, at any time, expressly waive their right to bring an action to
set aside." D6cret 2011-48 du 13 janvicr 2011 portant r6foric de l'arbitragc [Decree
2011-48 of 13 January 2011 on the reform of arbitration], JOURNAL OFFCICTET DE LA
RLPUBLIQUL FRANAISE [1.0.] [OFFICAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],Jan. 14, 2011.
97. General National Maritime Transport Co. v. Socictc G6tavcrken Arendal,

(our d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Feb. 21, 1980, Rev. Arb. 524.
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contract that was signed and performed outside France.
Although the seat of the arbitration was in Paris, the French
court held that it had no authority to review and set aside the
ensuing award. The Paris Court of Appeal reasoned that an
award that has otherwise no links with France is not necessarily
subject to the authority of the French legal system and French
courts merely because the seat of the arbitration was in France.
Soon after Gitaverhen, the Paris Court of Appeal held in
AKSA v. Norsolorand in similar factual circumstances that French
courts have no authority to review an award rendered in France,
even when one of the parties to the arbitration was French 8
These were, again, progressive but short-lived decisions; the
French legislature was quick to enact an International
Arbitration Decree in May 1981 that expressly allowed judicial
scrutiny by French courts of arbitral awards rendered in France,
irrespective of whether they are otherwise connected to France
or not.
Against this context, international tribunals have naturally
felt bound to follow a national law when determining the
arbitration process and when deciding whether the subject
matter of a dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration." Only
98. See AKSA v. Norsolor, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Dec.
9, 1980, Rev. Arb. 306.
99. See, e.g., Homtayoon Atfazadch, Arbitrability under the New York Convention: The
Lex Fori Revisited, 17 ARB. INTL 76 (2001); Homtayoon Arfazadch, ORDRL PUBLIC ET
ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL A I'EPRFUVE DE LA MONDIALISATION [PUBLIC ORDER AND
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PU-T TO THE TEST OF GLOBALIZATION] 95 (2006); Piero
Bernardini, The Problem of Arbitrabiliht in General, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA
kWARDS: THE NEW CONVENTION IN
PRACTICE, 503 (Ermanuel Gaillard & Domenico Di Pietro eds., 2008; LEW, MISTELIS &
KROLL, supra note 66, paras. 9-13 (stating that "in the majority of cases courts have
determined the question of arbitrability at the pre-award stage according to their own
national law"); see also European Convention art. V1(2) (stating that "[t]he courts may
also refuse recognition of the arbitration agreement if under the law of their country
the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration"); Bernard Hanotiaul, 1What Law
Governs the Issue ofAribitrabilty ?, 12 ARB. INTT 391 (1996); VAN DEN BERG, supra note 66,
at 153 (stating that "all courts [have] decided the question of arbitrability exclusively
under their own law and [have] not take [n] account of the law of the country where
the arbitration was to take place or was taking place"). Indeed, tribunals have been
applying national law to determine arbitrability. See, e.g., SCC Arbitration 053/2005.
Final Award (2006), in 1 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB. REV. 211 (2007) (referring to Art.
V2 (II) of the New York Convention and applying the law of the place of arbitrationFinnish law on that occasion-in order to decide whether a dispute involving an
insolvent party can be the subject matter of arbitration and noting that "in arbitrations
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a few tribunals have applied transnational or a-national rules to
determine, for example, the existence or validity of an
arbitration clause."o' Even fewer have applied transnational or anational rules to determine whether a dispute can be submitted
to arbitration.'ll Some tribunals have even come to regret the
decision to rely on transnational or a-national rules, and have
3
seen their awards being annulled1 o2 or refused enforcement. 10s
For example, the arbitral tribunal in Peterson Farms,Inc. v. C
& M Farming, Ltd. refused to apply the national law of the
underlying contract to determine the validity of the arbitration
agreement. Instead the tribunal determined the question of
validity in accordance with the common intention of the parties,
reasoning that "the autonomy of arbitration agreements has
become a universal principle in the realm of international
commercial arbitration."' 1 English courts set the award partially
aside noting that "'the autonomy' of the arbitration agreement
conducted in Finland the arbitrators should be guided by Finnish law when
determining whether or not the dispute is arbitrable"). The same approach was taken
by a tribunal sitting in London, which applied English and European law to determine
whether a dispute involving an insolvent party can be subject to arbitration,. The
decision of the tribunal was upheld by English courts. Syska & Elcktrim SA v. Vivcndi &
Others [2008] EWHC 2155 (Comm); Syska & lIektrim SA v. Vivendi & Others [2009]
EW(A (Civ) 677.
100. See, e.g., Dow Chemical v. Isovcr-Saint-Gobain, Case No. 4131 of 1982, 9 Y.B.
Com. Arb. 131 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.) (taking into account the usages conforming to the
needs of international commerce) ("EL en tenant 6galeincnt contc ... des usages
conforincs aux bcsoins du commerce international."); see also Case No. 6000 of 1988
(1991), 2(2) ICC Int'l Ct. Arb. Bull. (1991), 34 (noting "the usages of the international
trade ...

would justify and require the extension to this company, party to a group of

companics, of the arbitration clauses included in the contracts executed" by the other
companies of the group); see also Case No. 5894 of 1989, 2(2) ICC Int'l Ct. Arb. Bull.
(1991), 25: cited in Case No. 5721 of 1990, 117 JDI (Clunet) 1019; C&M Farming Ltd v.
Peterson Farms, Inc., ICC Award (Mar. 10, 2003) (unpublished).
101. See, e.g:, Case No. 6719 of 1991, in COLLECTION OF ICC A;kWARDS 1991-1995,
at 567; Case No. 6149 of 1990, in COILECTION OF ICC AkWARDS 1991-1995, at 315; see
also BORN, supra note 92, at 523-24 (taking the view that issues of material scope of
tribunals should be determined by substantive transnational rules, as choice of law
analyses is not capable of producing coherent or satisfactoly results, which frustrate the
parties' objectives, although he also accepts at the end that this matter should be
subject to state public policy).
102. Peterson Farms, Inc. v. C & M Farming Ltd. [2004] 1 LLOYD's RLP. 603.
103. Dallah v. Pakistan, [2009] EWX(A (Civ) 755 (Eng.) (refusing to enforce an
award that had applied a-national substantive rules to determine the validity and scope
of an arbitration clause).
104. Peterson Farms, Inc. v. C & M Farming, Ltd. [2003] EH(IC 2298 (Comi) at
44-45.
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is not in point. The question is whether [an arbitration
agreement] is governed by [a national law]. In my judgment it
plainly is." There was, therefore, "no basis for the tribunal to
apply any other [rules] whether supposedly derived from 'the
common intent of the parties' or not."10
Overall, international arbitration remains firmly subject to
national laws and state public policy, while international tribunals
are considered to be subservient to national courts as opposed
to being an alternative to them.
IV. CONNECTING ARBITL4TION WITH LEGAL

INTERNATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP: DEVELOPINGA CONCEPT
OFARBITRATION LAW
It was the failure of arbitration scholarship to engage with
two crucial developments in international legal scholarship that
mostly impaired the development of a concept of arbitration law
and the claim for normative potency: first, the collapse of
formalism and the move from legal rules to legal norms and
principles; second, the move from a state-centred to a pluralistic
world.
As was discussed above, in today's highly diverse and
multidimensional world of multiple normative communities,
there is neither a single fundamental test for law nor a single
fundamental source of law. Both state and non-state actors have
the capacity to develop and promulgate norms that regulate
crucial aspects of business transactions and non-business
activities. While a large proportion of legal rules are still enacted
by states, an increasing number of legal norms neither derive
authority or validity from a state institution nor require
enforceability by a state agency.
Freed from the rule of a single source of law and pedigree,
international arbitration qualifies as a community with the
capacity to engender non-state rules which the members of this
community accept as normative. Before we further discuss this
thesis, two clarifications are required: first, the discussion on
arbitration's normativity here goes beyond the authority of an
arbitral tribunal to determine a dispute. This type of

105. Id.
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normativity, which can be referred to as inter partes normativity,
derives from arbitration agreements and is mainly a matter of
contract law. This work examines the broader aspect of
arbitration's normativity, namely the normative potency of
arbitration law and arbitration community. Second, the focus of
the examination here is on procedural rules and norms rather
than on substantive ones. Since international arbitration is a
legal system of procedure, any rule developed within this system
mainly pertains to the conduct of arbitration.
From this procedural standpoint, clear norms regulating
the conduct of arbitration have emerged through constant
arbitration practices, and with the simultaneous contribution of
a variety of national and transnational sources. These sources
include arbitration institutions, 1io associations and councils,o7
arbitration specialized departments of law firms, 08 commercial
organizations and chambers. 10, More arbitration cases, both
investment and commercial, are now in the public domain,' (o

106. Such institutions may have international scope, for example, the
International Court of Arbitration of the International Chanbcrs of Commerce
("ICC") and the London Court of International Arbitration ("LCLA"), or regional
scope like the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration and the
Singapore International Arbitration Centrc.
107. Sec for example, thc American Arbitration Association, the Intcrnational Bar
Association (Arbitration Subcommittee), and the International Council for
Commercial Ar bitration.
108. Cf Tcubner, supra notc 42, at 4 ("Pcrhaps thc most intcrcsting and dynamic
phenomenon within law's empire itself is the development of private worldwide law
offices, multinational law firms, which tend to takc a global perspctive of conflict
regulation.").
109. The International Chambers of Commerce has had an instrumental role in
thc devclopment on international arbitration. JOHN BRAITIHWAITE & PETFR I)RAHOS,
GLOBAL BUSINLSS RLG(ULATION 27-28 (2000) (listing the ICC as one of the most
important actors in the globalization of regulation "because, in addition to having an
intcrcst-group strategy for shaping regulation. for sevcnty years it has had a private
ordcring strategy bascd on rccording its members' custoinmary practices and releasing
them in the form of model rules and agreements"). Further, the Swiss Chambers of
Coinmercc and the Stockholm Chambers of Comeincrce has had a very important
contribution to arbitration.
110. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMFNT DISPUTES
("ICSID"), http://icsid.worldbank.org/I(SID/Indcxjsp
(listing all invcstnent
arbitration treaty awards undcr thc International Ccntre for Settlemint of Invcstmcnt
Disputes

("ICSID"));

KLAUWER

ARBITRATION

DATABASE,

http://ww,.kluwcrarbitration.com (listing a large nunbcr of commercial arbitration
awards). A numbcr of ICC Awards are published in thre ICC Bullcins and in Cdited
volumes of COLLECTION OF AWARDS.
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while the number of weekly arbitration conferences, seminars,
events, and roundtable discussions have arguably reached a
point of excess. This very dynamic process of accumulation of
information, amplified by the use of new-age technology such
listserys"' and blogs,"1 rapidly produces" a burgeoning volume
of highly technical knowledge which continuously informs the
members of the arbitration community.
As a result, arbitration lawyers tend to speak the same
'language' in the context of arbitration proceedings. This
procedural Esperanto 114 comprises of a-national rules and
practices, which exhibit considerable convergence on many
aspects of the arbitration process,' 15 such as the commencement
of arbitration,"1 the constitution of an arbitral tribunal,'1 the
method which tribunals follow to determine the applicable
substantive law,'18 and the requirements for a valid aw ard. '19

Ill . See for the example the listserve for Oil., GAS, ENERGY, MINING,
INFRASTRUCTURL, AND INVESTMENT DISPUTLS ("OGEMID"), http://wwwtransnationaldispute-managernent.corn/ogemid (last visited May 17, 2013), which is a hub of daily
communication

and discussion among thousands of arbitration practitioners and

scholars.

112.

For

example,

see

the

KIUWER

ARBITRATION

BIOG

http://klowerarbitrationblog.coi (last visited May 17, 2013).
113. Cf Gunther Tcubner, Global Private Regi.es: Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual
Constitutions ofJAutonomous Sectors in World Society?, In PUBnIC GOVERNANCE IN THF AGE
OF (LOBAIIZATION

71, (Karl Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004) (referring to "neo-spontaneous

law").
114. See Werner Melis, Presentation oj Docunentary Evidence and Witnesses, in
PREVENTING DELAY AND DISRUPTION OF ARBITRATION, ICCA Congress Series, v. 5, 51115 (Albert Jan Van den Berg ed., 1991) (mentioning the term in relation to procedure).
1 15. Catherine Rogers, The Vocation oj the InternationalArbitrator,20 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 957, 999-1000 (2005) (referring to this as "procedural rule-making process"
whereby "arbitration proceedings generate procedural rules and practices,.. that
serve as precedent for luture arbitrations and beyond.").
116. For example, see ICC Rules Ar t. 4, LCIA Art.1, Swiss Rules of International
Ai bitration Ar t. 2, and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules A t.2, which all have very similar
content.
117. For examplc, see ICC Rules Arts.11-15, LCIA Arts.5-8, Swiss Rules of
International Aibitration AItS. 5-8, and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules AItS. 8-10, which
all have very similar content.
118. For examplc, see ICC Rules Art. 21, LCIA Art. 22.3, Swiss Rules of
International Arbitration Art. 35, and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Ar t. 35, which they
all have very similar content.
119. For exampic, see ICC Rules AItS. 30-35, LCIA Art. 26, Swiss Rules of
Internatioal Arbitration Arts. 31-32, and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Art. 34, which

they all have very similar content.
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Even extremely technical and culturally dependent matters
such as the taking of evidence have gone through a process of
considerable assimilation. A typical example here is the
International Bar Association (IBA) Rules on the Taking of
Evidence in International Arbitration, which reflect and codify
best practices on a number of evidentiary matters such as the
presentation of documents, witnesses of fact and expert
witnesses, inspections as well as the conduct of evidentiary
hearings.120
While the IBA Rules have been promulgated as nonbinding rules,1'2 they currently enjoy wide acceptance within the
international arbitration community. 22
Standard practices and norms gradually emerge not only
with regard to the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. They
also emerge with regard to advocacy and ethical conduct before
international tribunals. 121 International arbitration lawyers feel
now more than ever before part of a transnational group of
counsel, which transcends national bar associations. Arbitration
counsel tend to observe legal ethics as well as advocacy practices
which as Laurence Shore notes are "outside their customary
intellectual abodes" and which "give them the opportunitv to
exercise objective detachment, become intellectually honest
counsel" and "discard, or at least modify, nationally driven
interpretations"
when
appearing
before
international
tribunals124
120. See 2010 1B4 Rules on the Taking oJ Evidence in InternationalArbitration, INT'L
BAR Ass'N, http:'//ww.ibanetorg/ LPD/DisputeResolutionSection/Ai biration/
IliA Rules Eividence,/Overview.aspx (replacing the 1999 IBA, which themselves
replaced the IBA Supplementary Rules Governing the Presentation and Reception of
Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, issued in 1983).
121. See Georg von Segesser, The lB4 Rales on the Taking oJEvidence in International
Arbitration:Revised Version, adopted by the InternationalBarAssociation on 29 MWay
2010, 28
ASA BULLLTIN 735 (2010).
122. See 2012 Empial Sarvey Curt
and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process,
SCH.
OF
INT'L
ARB,
QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON (2012),
http://www.arbitrationonline.org/suvey [hereinafter 2012 QMUL Empirical Survey]
(finding that the IBA rules are adopted in sixty percent of arbitrations).
123. See About, FOUND. FOR INTL ARB. ADV., http://wmy.fiaa.con (noting the
organization is dedicated to providing advocacy training specifically designed for

international arbitration) (last visited May 17, 2013).
124 . Laurence Shore, Arbitration, Rhetoric, Proof: The UnitY of International
Arbitration Across Cultures, in CONTIMPORARY ISSUELS IN1INTERNATI)NAL ARBITRATION
AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 293 (2009).
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The emergence of a-national implicit and explicit rules on
the conduct of arbitration is itself crucial. What is more
important is the fact that the members of arbitration community
tend to follow these rules and accept them to guide their
conduct. This type of acceptance is crucial to identify
normativity. As Dworkin observes, the difference between a
statement of a normative rule and a statement of a nonnormative (social) rule is the attitude that the members of a
community display towards the rule. The attitude of the
members of a community towards a normative rule is that of
acceptance of the rule as a standard for guiding their own
conduct and for evaluating the conduct of the other members of
the community. 125 Thus, through the increasing number of
harmonized arbitration practices and standards, a common
ground of settled assumptions in relation to the conduct of arbitration
has emerged.@ Certain aspects of arbitration practice are so
well-established among arbitration lawyers that breed expectations
of compliance, or "normative expectations."'27
To give an example, in a commercial dispute of significant
value, it is generally expected that substantive submissions will
be offered in writing form, and that they will be exchanged
sequentially, most likely in two rounds comprising of a statement
of claim and statement of defense, reply and most likely a
rejoinder.u8 Further, fact witness evidence is generally expected
supra note 52. at 51.
126. Alan Ran, The Culture ofJAmerican Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 449-50 (2004-05) ("we are increasingly seeing in the actual governance of
international arbitrations a pattern of 'Convergence'; there has developed a set of
common assumptions as to how an arbitration will be conducted, drawing from and
harmonizing the assumptions of divergent legal cultures."); c. Gabrielle KaufmannKohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure. 36 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313. 1323 (2003)
(noting that party autonomy "has allowed arbitration practice to develop a set of rules
which progressively rise to thc level of a standard arbitration procedure" and which has
"the invaluable ncrit of merging different procedural cultures"); see also Catherine
Rogers, International Arbitration's Public Realm, in CONTEMIPORARY ISSUFS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERAS 293 (2010)
(pointing out that "the evolution of these now well-settled procedural norns occurred
less through formal exchange of published opinions than through the crosspollenization that comes with the overlapping experiences of those in the international
125. DwoRKIN,

arbitration comnnunity").

127 . See Teubner, supra note 42, at 10 (referring also to "normative
expectations"); Cotterrcll, TransnationalCommunities, supra note 36, at 5-6. 10.
128. Cf 2012 QMUL Empirical Survey, supra note 122 (finding that eighty-two
percent of the respondents said that substantive written submissions are most
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to be offered by exchange of written statements,1 29 together with
cross-examination.1 so Finally, an oral hearing on the merits is
largely expected.'-,
Of course, and depending on the circumstances of the case,
a tribunal may agree with the parties to vary this basic
procedural model, and make arrangements for expert witnesses,
production of documents, additional pre-hearing and posthearing submissions. However, none of these additional options
constitute aberrations. Rather they constitute well-known
variations of a typical arbitration process, which are also well
anticipated by arbitration practitioners.
Equally importantly, the above norms in arbitration
practice have not developed accidentally. They have developed
by reference to the fundamental legal principle of fair process.
The principle of fair process requires that each arbitration party
must be treated equally and must be given the opportunity to
present each case, as well as that the arbitration will be
conducted in a manner that avoids unnecessary delays. The
principle of fair process and the ensuing sub-principles apply in
arbitration not because they are stipulated in all arbitration laws
and arbitration rules.1 Rather, the fact that these principles
universally feature in arbitration laws and rules is evidence of
their wide institutional support. 1ss The existence of legal
commonly exchanged sequentially, and seventy-nine percent prefer it sequentially;
sixty-three percent of the respondents said that the most common number of
substantive written submissions that are exchanged between the parties is four (i.e. two
full rounds): a Statement of Case, Statement of Defence, Reply and Rejoinder (or
similar designations).
129. Id. (finding that in eighty-seven percent of arbitrations fact witness evidence
is offered by exchange of written witness statements).
130. Id. (noting that the vast majority of respondents said that cross-examination
was either always or usually an effective form of testing the evidence of fact witnesses
(ninety percent) and expert witnesses (cighty-six percent)).
131. Id. (finding that in ninety-six percent of arbirations oral hearings are
conducted, and eighty-five percent are held at the legal seat).
132. See English Arbitration Act s.33 (1996) (Eng.) (providing that "the tribunal
shall (a) act fairly and impartially as between the partics, giving each party a reasonable
opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, and (b) adopt
procedures suitable to the circunstances of the particular case avoiding unnecessary
delays of expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling
to be determined"); see also Model Law Art. 18 (" [T]he parties shall be treated with
equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case.").
133. DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 40, (observing that we need to be able to find
some kind of institutional support for the claim that a legal principle exists "and the
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principles is a distinctive feature of a system or a normative
community, as they set out the general values, goals and needs

of that community, which guide the behaviour of the members
of that community. 3 4 The legal principle of fair process "brings
about mutual orientations" 13 among arbitration lawyers as
regards the conduct of arbitration proceedings and further
enhances
the normative
potency of the arbitration
community.1 6
Some scholars have contested arbitration's normativity on
the basis that it lacks coercive power to enforce and execute the
decisions of international tribunals, including procedural orders
and awards.1 37 It is questionable whether such critical emphasis
can be placed on arbitration's lack of coercive powers. It is now
commonplace to observe that in arbitration the vast majority of
procedural orders and arbitral awards are voluntarily complied
with by the parties.' 8 This is not just suggested by anecdotal
experience; it has been demonstrated by empirical surveys.1'3
more [institutional] support we found, the more weight we could claim for the
principle."). Although he accepts that "wvecould not devise any formula for testing how
much and what kind of institutional support is necessary to make a principle a legal
principle", he observes that if this principle is exemplified in a statute. or is discussed
and citied in a decision, this wvould bring strong support for the principle. Id.
134. The normative potency of legal principles is well know from the work of
Dworkin who has showed that lkgal obligations may derive from fundamental legal
principles and that law includes both legal principles and rules; see Dworkin, sapra note
52, at 28. For the meaning and importance of legal principles in business regulation, see
also BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 109. at 18 (noting that principles have less
specificity but they constitute an agreed standard of conduct and propel action in a
certain direction).
135. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 109, at 19.

136. See supra note 127.
137. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 51, at 694 ("Enforcement power is, precisely, the
form of jurisdictional power that the lex mercatoria most certainly lacks. A commercial
arbitral award, in order to gain access to coercive might, must meet the requirements
Set by the public lkgal system. The lex mercatoria lacks an important element of
autonomy, as it still needs to rely on national courts for enforcement.").

138. See BORN, supra note 92, at 2710.
139. See 2008 Empical Survey. SCH. OF INT'L ARB., QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF

LONDON, in Loukas Mistclis & Crina Baltag, Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards and Settlenent in International Arbitration, 19 AM. REV. INT'i ARB. 343 (2010)
[hereinafter 2008 QMUL Empirical Survey]. Cf Richard Naiiark & Stephanie Kecr,
1nternational Private ConmercialArbitration. Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and
Buiness People: a Forced- Rank Analysis, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, 43 (Christopher Draholzal and Richard Naimark eds., 2005) (finding a
high rate of voluntary compliance with awards. but in most cases courts also play a rol

in compliance).
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More interestingly, empirical data suggests that the majority of
the parties voluntarily comply with arbitral awards to avoid
tarnishing their business reputation as recalcitrant parties. 140
Thus, international arbitration is perceived by international
corporations as the natural forum for the resolution of disputes
between international merchants; similarly, arbitral awards are
perceived as the authoritative pronouncement of such a forum.
They are perceived as norms that can informally, i.e. without the
intervention of state courts, regulate international trade
groups. 141As Posner observes "when members of a solitary

group transact, norms and non-legal sanctions generally resolve
disputes [. . .] Norms also prohibit bad faith and opportunism.
The importance of maintaining a good reputation and of
avoiding ostracism deters improper behavior. Accordingly,
insiders can dispense with expensive formalities-lawyers, bonds,
even writings-and with the unreliable courts." 142 From this
standpoint, the focus shifts from
'enforceability'
to
'compliance', and from 'coercion' to 'normative persuasion.'14 s

140. 2008 QMUL empirical survey, supra note 139.
141.

See generally CHRIS REED, MAKING LAWS FOR CYBERSPACE (2012) (making the

same point in relation to the enforcement

of norms and rules in cyberspace

communities). He notes that enforcement of cybcrspace norms rules is not usually

achieved through the use of state's coercive power; rather the authority of a cyberspace
norm will be accepted if the cybcrspacc actor has become a virtual member of the
community which that lawmakcr regulates. Id.
142. See Stavros Brek oulakis, Enforcement oJ Foreign Arbitrl Awards: Obsrvatior.s or
the Efficiency of the Current System and the Gradual Development of Alternative Means of
Enforcement, 19 AM. REV. IINT'L ARB. 428 (2010); Eric Posner. The Regulation of Groups:
the Influence oJLegal and Non Legal Sanctions on Collective Ation, 63 U. CHT. I. REV. 133,
155, 156. 165 (1996), has also argued on the basis of a law and economics analysis that
within members of a coherent ("solidary") group, non-legal sanctions (i.e. the group's

enforcement mechanism) will likely be superior to that of the courts. "When members
of a solidary group transact, norms and non-legal sanctions generally resolve disputes.

When contingencies arise. norms allocate risks and specify means of resolution. Norms
also prohibit bad faith and opportunism. The importance of maintaining a good
reputation and of avoiding ostracism deters improper behavior. Accordingly, insiders
can dispense with expensive forimalities-lawyers, bonds, even writings-and with the
unreliable courts."Id.
143. This is of course not an observation concerning arbitration only. It is a
suggestion empirically tested in many other fields of the globalization of business
regulation. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 109, at 10 (noting through
case studies that a wide range of globalized business regulation and have found that
"globalized rules and principles can be of consequence even if Utterly detached from

enforcement mechanisms . . . . Modelling of self-regulatory principles and the rules of
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An arbitral award that is perceived by the parties as accurately
reflecting the prevailing and evolving standards and practices of
that community is more likely to enjoy acquiescence and
deference by the business community.144
This is not to argue that arbitral awards are somehow selfexecuting, if a recalcitrant party refuses to voluntarily comply
with the decision of an international tribunal. Parties still resort
to states to have an award enforced against a recalcitrant party.
However, this does not constitute evidence that arbitration lacks
normative autonomy. In today's pluralistic world, state and nonstate communities coexist, while often their jurisdiction
overlaps. 14 5 Thus, arbitration's claim of autonomy entails coexistence and cooperation with national states rather than isolation
and antagonism. What is crucial is that the majority of the arbitral
awards are complied with voluntarily in the first place. The small
number of recalcitrant party that refuse to comply with an
arbitral award will either face the informal sanction of
undermining their business reputation or face the coercive
power of state enforcement.
CON\CLUSION
Progressive legal scholarship in the last fifty years has
advanced a broader and more progressive concept of
international law, which includes not only state rules, but also
norms, policies, principles and standards. Of course, the
concept of international law that has emerged after the collapse
of legal formalism remains not without challenges. As rules
blend with norms and policies, international lawyers will now
have to examine how international law can maintain its
normative potency and its distinctiveness from politics. Although
this type of challenge may well prove pervasive, it is a price

worth paying for the fact that contemporary international law
has become more progressive and humanitarian, encompassing
the private justice systems of corporations are crucial to understanding how the
globalization of regulation happens").
144. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction 151 U. PA. L. RLV. 440
(2002), (observing correctly that the power and relevance of decisions wvithin the
incinbers of a conmunity depends on whether they "accurately reflect evolving norms
of the communities that they mnust choose to obey t hei").

I45. Id.; see also Cotterrell, Spectres, supra note 2.
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matters relating to health care, environment, human rights, and
redistribution of wealth.
Meanwhile, international arbitration scholarship has failed
to engage with this type of discourse and has largely grown
under the delusion that it is a self-sufficient field. As the article
explained, arbitration scholarship was mainly produced by
practicing lawyers, whose main concern was to develop
arbitration doctrine and respond to problems arising in
arbitration practice. Exclusive focus on doctrinal jurisprudence
may have helped international tribunals to expand the scope of
their authority over disputes that previously fell within the
exclusive domain of state courts, but it has eventually impaired
the concept of arbitration law. By failing to engage with
sociolegal jurisprudence on pluralism and legal theories on antiformalism, arbitration scholarship failed to advance persuasive
claims of autonomy and normativity of arbitration law. As a
result, internationalarbitration remains firmly subject to national
laws and state public policy, while international tribunals are
considered to be subservient to national courts as opposed to
being an alternativeto them.
One of the main goals of the article was to look into

scholarship on legal pluralism and connect it with arbitration
law. Freed from the rule of a single source of law and pedigree,
international arbitration qualifies as a community with the
capacity to engender non-state rules which the members of this
community accept as normative. As the article showed, clear
norms regulating the conduct of arbitration have emerged
through constant arbitration practices, which members of the
arbitration community tend to follow and accept them to guide
their conduct and behavior. Equally importantly, normative
expectations concerning the conduct of arbitration have
developed by reference to the fundamental arbitration legal
principle of fair process. As has been argued, the existence of
legal principles is a distinctive feature of a system or a normative
community, as they set out the general values, goals and needs
of that community, and they guide the behavior of the members
of that community. For arbitration, the existence of the legal
principle of fair process guides the practice of arbitration
lawyers as regards the conduct of arbitration proceedings and
breeds expectations of compliance, or "normative expectations."

20131

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SCHOLARSHIP

787

The above does not purport to suggest that international
arbitration is a homogeneous and hierarchically structured
system; it is not. Nor does it suggest that evolving arbitration
norms are free from indeterminacy or indeed ambiguities; they
are not. Nor is it suggested that arbitral tribunals can always
function without interacting with state courts and state laws; they
cannot. However, homogeneous and fully determinate rules
exist in state law only. After 50 years of progressive legal
scholarship we now know that state law is not the only kind of
law existing in our contemporary world. Normativity occurs in
both state and non-state communities, and in different forms
and degrees.146 As Cotterrell observes, from a genuinely legal
pluralistic perspective, "one does not expect to see legal regimes
all of the same kind (they could be very diverse), and some
regimes will be more legal than others."14 Similarly, Dworkin notes
that the normative potency of a legal principle will depend on
the degree of institutional support we can find for that
principle.148 It is within this concept of relative normativity that
international arbitration can more forcefully claim its normative
potency, in the form of procedural practices and standards that
derive from legal principles, guide the conduct of arbitration
and breed expectations of compliance.

146. See Cotterell, Spectres, supra note 2, at 485 ("Legal pluralist ... should be
seen ... as supporting the radical claims that, as regards their practical authority, forms
of social regulation form a continuum; that lines between the 'legal' and 'non-legal'
depend on perspective; and that the lkgal character (however assessed) of regulation is
often a matter of degree and (not necessarily resolvable) debate. Some sources of
regulation may seem more 'official' than others, but what counts as official becomes a
mattcr of controversy and varies with viewpoint, as sources of regulatory authority
compete."). At the end, legal pluralism as many of its proponents argue is not about
truly autonomous transnational systems, but about systems with overlapping
jurisdictions and some national territorial links too. See Berman, supra note 144, at 501.
147. Roger Cotterell, Transnational Networks and International Economic Law,
Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.
125/2012. available atIItp://ssrn.com/abstract=2154392 (last visited May 17, 2013).
148. See DWORKIN, supra note 52; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.

